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INTRODUCTION
One of the most crucial, but systematically neglected, comparative
differences between corporate law systems in Europe and the United
States concerns regulation governing freeze-out transactions in listed
corporations. For the purposes of this Article, freeze-outs can be defined
as transactions in which the controlling shareholder exercises a legal
right to buy out the shares of the minority, consequently delisting the
corporation and bringing it private.' Beyond this essential definition, the
systems diverge profoundly.
1. The acquisition of all the outstanding shares of a corporation by one of its shareholders can
obviously occur also in a nonlisted corporation, and some legal systems allow majority share-
holders of closely-held corporations to compel minority shareholders to transfer their shares.
"Freeze-out," in fact, is neither a well-defined term of art, nor does it have a precise statutory or
case law definition. It is commonly used to describe several different situations in which majority
shareholders force minority shareholders to sell their shares either through a statutory provision or
simply by creating defacto-and sometimes abusive-incentives to sell the shares. This Article
focuses on transactions in which a controlling shareholder in a listed corporation has a legal right
to buy out the shares of the minority and does so with the goal of delisting it. Delisting is usually
a consequence of a minority buy-out, but the conditions for delisting vary in different legal sys-
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Few studies have undertaken to examine the differences between the
European and U.S. approaches to minority freeze-outs, despite the fact
that they are among the most debated issues in corporate law,2 the pub-
lic media,3 a vast body of scholarly work, and case law in the United
States4 and Europe. 5 In light of the relevance of the subject and the ex-
tems and, in some instances, it is possible to delist a corporation even if there are still minority
shareholders. For a discussion of the delisting phenomenon and its underlying economic determi-
nants, see Jonathan Macey et al., Down and Out in the Stock Market: The Law and Economics of
the Delisting Process, 51 J.L. & ECON. 683 (2008). The terms "freeze-out" and "squeeze-out" are
occasionally used interchangeably, even though the latter should refer specifically to techniques
used by controlling shareholders and/or managers to extract benefits from the corporation and
minimize the gains of minority shareholders while they remain members of the business organiza-
tion. These techniques, whether legal or not, are mainly used in closely-held corporations. A typi-
cal example of a "squeeze-out" technique might be to pay high salaries only to the controlling
shareholder who is also an employee of the corporation, while refusing to distribute dividends to
all the shareholders.
2. For some of the most important cases that will be discussed in this Article, see Glassman v.
Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242 (Del. 2001); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701
(Del. 1983); In re Pure Res., Inc., S'holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421 (Del. Ch. 2002).
3. See Robin Sidel, Takeover Targets Force Up Offers In 'Minority Squeeze-Out' Deals,
WALL ST. J., May 10, 2002, at C3 (discussing factors that have encouraged squeeze-out deals);
David Wessel, Closing the Door: Going Private Offers Rewards, WALL ST. J., May 17, 2007, at
A2 (proposing reasons why public companies may be eager to go private).
4. For the most recent contributions to freeze-outs in the United States, with specific refer-
ence to Delaware law, see William T. Allen et al., Function over Form: A Reassessment of Stan-
dards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 Bus. LAW. 1287 (2001); Bradley R. Aronstam
et al., Delaware's Going-Private Dilemma: Fostering Protections for Minority Shareholders in
the Wake of Siliconix and Unocal Exploration, 58 BUS. LAW. 519 (2003); Bradley R. Aronstam et
al., Revisiting Delaware's Going-Private Dilemma Post-Pure Resources, 59 BUS. LAW. 1459
(2004); Kimble Charles Cannon, Augmenting the Duties of Directors To Protect Minority Share-
holders in the Context of Going-Private Transactions: The Case for Obligating Directors To Ex-
press a Valuation Opinion in Unilateral Tender Offers After Siliconix, Aquila and Pure Re-
sources, 2003 COLuM. BUS. L. REV. 191 (2003); Clark W. Furlow, Back to Basics: Harmonizing
Delaware's Law Governing Going Private Transactions, 40 AKRON L. REV. 85 (2007); Ronald J.
Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785
(2003); Leo Herzel & Dale E. Coiling, Establishing Procedural Fairness in Squeeze-Out Mergers
After Weinberger v. UOP, 39 Bus. LAW. 1525 (1984); Peter V. Letsou & Steven M. Haas, The
Dilemma that Should Never Have Been: Minority Freeze Outs in Delaware, 61 BUS. LAW. 25
(2005); Ely R. Levy, Freeze-Out Transactions the Pure Way: Reconciling Judicial Asymmetry
Between Tender Offers and Negotiated Mergers, 106 W. VA. L. REV. 305 (2004); Michael J.
McGuinness & Timo Rehbock, Going-Private Transactions: A Practitioner's Guide, 30 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 437 (2005); Charles W. Murdock, Squeeze-Outs, Freeze-Outs, and Discounts: Why is
Illinois in the Minority in Protecting Shareholder Interests?, 35 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 737 (2004);
A.C. Pritchard, Tender Offers by Controlling Shareholders: The Specter of Coercion and Fair
Price, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 83 (2004); Mary Siegel, Going Private: Three Doctrines Gone As-
tray, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 399 (2008); Faith Stevelman, Going Private at the Intersection of the
Market and the Law, 62 Bus. LAW. 775 (2007); Guhan Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, 115
YALE L.J. 2 (2005); Elliott J. Weiss, Balancing Interests in Cash-Out Mergers: The Promise of
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 8 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (1983); Brian M. Resnick, Note, Recent Delaware
Decisions May Prove to Be "Entirely Unfair" to Minority Shareholders in Parent Merger with
2010]
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tensive and growing number of transatlantic mergers in which the ac-
quiring corporations and target corporations are subject to different le-
gal regimes,6 the dearth of research focused on comparing the European
and American approaches to minority freeze-outs is startling.7 This Ar-
ticle fills the gap by offering, first, a comparative discussion of freeze-
out regulations in the United States and in Europe; second, an explana-
tion for the causes and consequences of the differences between the two
regulatory regimes; and, third, a reform proposal for the development of
financial markets in both Europe and the United States.
Partially Owned Subsidiary, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 253.
5. For a discussion of freeze-out rights under Article 15 of the Takeover Directive (Council
Directive 2004/25, 2001 O.J. (L 142) 12 (EC), also known as the "Thirteenth Directive") and the
price at which minorities can be liquidated, see Christoph Van der Elst & Lientje Van der Steen,
Balancing the Interests of Minority and Majority Shareholders: A Comparative Analysis of
Squeeze-out and Sell-out Rights, 6 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 391 (2009), and Timo Kaisan-
lahti, When Is a Tender Price Fair in a Freeze-out?, 8 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 497 (2007). On
the economic effects of price mechanisms in the freeze-out context pursuant to the Thirteenth Di-
rective, see Mike Burkart & Fausto Panunzi, Mandatory Bids, Squeeze-out, Sell-out and the Dy-
namics of the Tender Offer Process (Eur. Corporate Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No.
10, 2003), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract id-420940. A brief de-
scription of the implementation of the European Takeover Directive and its Article 15 concerning
freeze-out rights in several European countries is offered by 1 DIRK VAN GERVEN, COMMON
LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR TAKEOVER BIDS IN EUROPE (2008), and SILJA MAUL, DANItLE
MUFFAT-JEANDET, & JORLLE SIMON, TAKEOVER BIDS IN EUROPE: THE TAKEOVER DIRECTIVE
AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION IN THE MEMBER STATES (Silja Maul et al. eds., 2008). On specific
European jurisdictions, see Olivier Douvreleur, Un nouveau cas de retrait obligatoire: Le Retrait
Obligatoire dans la Foulge d'une Offre, 3 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT FINANCIER 58
(2006); Hubert Segain, Les Operation de Public to Private en France: Bilan et Perspectives, 5
BULL. JOLY BOURSE 536 (2005) (both contributions on France); Mathias Habersack, Beendigung
der Bdrsenzulassung, in MATHIAS HABERSACK, PETER 0. MOLBERT & MICHAEL SCHLITT,
UNTERNEHMENS-FINANZIERUNG AM KAPITALMARKT (2008) (on Germany). See generally
Alessandro Pomelli, "'Delisting" di societ quotata tra interesse dell'azionista di controllo e
tutela degli azionisti di minoranza, 54 RIviSTA DELLE SOCIETA 407 (2009) (on Italy).
6. Data on the volume of cross-border mergers and acquisitions from 1987 to 2005 have been
published by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. See U.N. CONFERENCE
ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2006, FDI FROM DEVELOPING AND
TRANSITION ECONOMIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT, at 13-14, U.N. Sales No.
E.06.II.D. 11 (2006), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2006_en.pdf (showing a peak
in cross-border activity in 2000, when the total value of international deals exceeded 860 billion
dollars). During 2003, 2004, and 2005, the total value of cross-border mergers and acquisitions
was on the rise again, going from approximately $141 billion to $200 billion to $454 billion. Ad-
ditional data on cross-border mergers and specific examples of important international acquisi-
tions in the last decade are offered by Oliver Budzinski, Toward an International Governance of
Transborder Mergers? Competition Networks and Institutions Between Centralism and Decen-
tralism, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 2 (2003).
7. One obvious reason for the gap is the difficulty implied by such an endeavor, which re-
quires analyzing profoundly different systems and rules. But this complexity is precisely what
makes the topic so worthy of study and the lack of scholarly attention even more puzzling.
FREEZE-OUTS
Much can be gained from a study of minority freeze-outs, from both
a theoretical and practical perspective. From a theoretical point of view,
freeze-outs of minorities lie on the contested frontier separating the
powers (and duties) of controlling shareholders and directors from the
rights of minority shareholders. It is a boundary drawn along the elusive
and politically charged line of efficiency and fairness. Comparative
scrutiny of the American and European attitudes toward freeze-outs al-
lows for identification of some of the most defining features of different
corporate law regimes, such as the kind of property interest that minori-
ties are deemed to maintain in the corporation, the role of litigation in
shaping corporate rules, and the propensity toward monetary damages
versus other types of relief for the protection of minorities.
From a more practical perspective, the opportunity to go private, its
costs, and its timing affect not only the prosperity of single corporations
at the micro level, but also the health of the financial system in which
they operate at the macro level. One may question whether going-
private transactions are value-maximizing, and how efficiency gains, if
any, are split among different stakeholders. As is often the case, the em-
pirical evidence is not conclusive. It is, however, unquestionable that
under specific circumstances, powerful financial, strategic, legal, and
tax considerations incentivize the majority shareholders to buy out the
minority's equity interests and delist the corporation. In many instances,
going private is in the best interest of all parties involved: majority and
minority shareholders, investors, creditors, employees, and other stake-
holders.8
8. Henry DeAngelo, Linda DeAngelo & Edward Rice, Going Private: Minority Freezeouts
and Stockholder Wealth, 27 J.L. & ECON. 367 (1984). Even if this work is quite dated, it still ex-
plains well the theoretical reasons why minority shareholders can appropriate part of the gains
connected with a going-private transaction and presents empirical evidence from the American
market in support of this hypothesis. Considering that the protections for minority shareholders
have been increased by several cases decided since the 1980s, which will be discussed later in this
Article, one might argue that the net gains of public shareholders in a freeze-out context are prob-
ably greater today than at the time of the study. More recently, empirical research has convincing-
ly demonstrated that minority shareholders can obtain a significant increase of wealth in a freeze-
out transaction. See Thomas W. Bates et al., Shareholder Wealth Effects and Bid Negotiation in
Freeze-Out Deals: Are Minority Shareholders Left Out in the Cold?, 81 J. FIN. ECON. 681 (2006).
The article observes that:
[O]n average, minority claimants in freeze-out bids actually receive approximately 11%
more than their pro-rata share of deal surplus generated at the bid announcement, an
excess distribution of roughly $6.1 million. These results are inconsistent with the no-
tion that controlling shareholders systematically undertake freeze-out transactions at the
expense of the minority claimants of the target firm.
Id. at 707. On the possible effect of freeze-outs on corporate constituencies different from share-
holders, see Kent Greenfield, The Impact of "Going Private" on Corporate Stakeholders, 3
2010]
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Going private is particularly desirable in times of financial crisis. A
credit crunch adversely affects the availability of liquidity necessary to
finance large leveraged acquisitions. Buying out minorities when mar-
ket prices are low, however, is an attractive option for controlling
shareholders and other specialized investors, such as private equity
firms and hedge funds. 9 Delisting may also be desirable in light of in-
creased regulatory burdens, which often follow in the wake of financial
crises. Finally, delisting may be attractive simply to avoid uncertainty
concerning future regulatory reforms and developments.
But going private is not a one-way street. If the consideration paid is
fair and includes a premium over market prices, the transaction may al-
so be welcomed by minorities, who can liquidate their investment at
better conditions than the ones offered by the market. Thus, provided
that adequate protections for minorities are in place, the decision to
withdraw from the stock exchange and to liquidate the interests of mi-
nority shareholders should not be banned nor rendered so difficult that
the U.S. approach is not an available alternative for controlling share-
holders and corporate executives. The degree to which different legal
systems allow freeze-out transactions also affects the propensity of
closely-held corporations to go public in the first place, and therefore
affects the role of stock exchanges as a source of capital.
This Article proceeds on the general assumption that European regu-
lation is more restrictive of freeze-outs than its U.S. counterpart. This
disparity reflects different philosophies concerning shareholders' rights
and minority protection. The European model is based on the idea that
every shareholder enjoys a substantially untouchable property right in
her shares. 10 Conversely, the American model allows greater flexibility
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 75 (2008). Professor Greenfield notes that "there is little reason
to be particularly skeptical of private companies, as compared to public companies, in their treat-
ment of stakeholder interests," and suggests that going private appears to be at least neutral in
terms of effects on corporate stakeholders. Id. at 75.
9. For an interesting analysis of the drop in market prices in the United States during the 2008
crisis and the possible relationship between the bearish market and corporate governance, see
Brian R. Cheffms, Did Corporate Governance "Fail" During the 2008 Stock Market Meltdown?
The Case of the S&P 500 (Eur. Corporate Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 124, 2009),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract--1396126. Cheffins mentions that:
At the close of trading on December 31, 2008, the Dow Jones Industrial Average was
8,776, a drop of 33.8% over the year, and the S&P 500 average was 903, representing a
38.5% annual decline. 2008 was the worst year for the S&P 500 since 1937 and the
worst for the Dow Jones since 1931.
Id. at 11.
10. The reference to "property right" in this Article is made for the sake of simplicity, and not
in a strictly technical sense. As correctly pointed out to me by Peter 0. Miulbert, a better expres-
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as a consequence of regulatory competition among states and the com-
mon law case-based approach. At the same time, this model lacks cer-
tainty and leads to partially contradictory outcomes. This Article, after a
critical discussion of freeze-out rules in the United States and Europe,
builds a comparative analysis to propose reforms that would increase
shareholder protection in the United States and foster more uniform
rules in Europe that would facilitate, under certain conditions, going-
private transactions.
The Article begins in Part I with a discussion of the economic rea-
sons for going private. Part II analyzes U.S. rules concerning freeze-
outs and going-private transactions, focusing, in particular, on Delaware
law. Part III discusses the corresponding European rules that, while not
uniform among states, nevertheless enjoy a certain degree of harmoniza-
tion due to the European Union's directives on mergers and takeovers.
Specific details on a selected number of countries will be offered,
though the goal of this work is more to capture the fundamental traits of
the European approach, rather than to unearth the technicalities of indi-
vidual jurisdictions. Part IV sums up the major differences between the
two systems and offers an explanatory theory of the different develop-
ments of the law in Europe and in the United States. Finally, Part V is
dedicated to the normative implications of the analysis.
I. RATIONALES FOR GOING PRIVATE
Several sound financial, regulatory, and organizational reasons sup-
port going private in certain circumstances. These reasons are intert-
wined and mutually interactive, making it difficult and probably incor-
rect to consider them as separate and distinguished factors. Generally
speaking, the same cost-benefit analysis that motivates going public also
suggests withdrawing from the public market when the net costs of be-
ing listed or publicly held outweigh the benefits."
sion would make reference to the German concept of Mitgliedschaft-the idea that the sharehold-
er has a contractual relationship with the other shareholders and the corporation, which cannot be
resolved without his consent. Email from Peter 0. Mulbert, Professor, Johannes Gutenberg-
Universitat Mainz, to author (Nov. 29, 2009) (on file with author).
11. A list of the most important reasons to go private can be found in Joshua M. Koening, A
BriefRoadmap to Going Private, 2004 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 505, 509 (2004). See also Sreedhar
T. Bharath & Amy K. Dittmar, To Be or Not to Be (Public) (Dec. 2006) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://papers.ssrnm.cosol3/papers.cftn?abstractid=951710; Sreedhar T. Bha-
rath & Amy K. Dittmar, Why Do Firms Use Private Equity to Opt Out of Public Markets? (Mar.
2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://webuser.bus.umich.edu/adittmar/
publicprivatepapermar 132007.pdf. A Federal Reserve Bank report suggests that one of the major
2010]
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The first rationale for going private is that sometimes market prices
of publicly traded securities fail to reflect the real value to the issuer.
Underestimation can be due to several causes, firm-specific (such as
lack of analysts' coverage or poor communication strategies), or general
(such as a bearish market caused by exogenous macroeconomic variables-
for example a sudden increase of interest rates on treasury bonds-that ad-
versely affects most listed corporations). In either circumstance, the costs
of staying public are inadequately compensated. Systematic underpric-
ing (real or perceived) of publicly-held shares erodes many of the ad-
vantages of going public, including the possibility of using stock op-
tions and other similar forms of compensation to attract and retain top
executives. Thus, buying out minorities can be a desirable option for
controlling shareholders and managers, who are then able to unlock the
hidden value of the firm, but also for minority shareholders, who can
then liquidate their shares at a higher price than what the market cur-
rently reflects.
Another reason to go private is to reduce the cost of compliance with
securities laws and regulations. In legal systems that rely heavily on pri-
vate litigation as a policing tool, going private curbs the risk of disrup-
tive legal disputes, even if, as will be discussed, the decision to go pri-
vate itself prompts shareholders' suits. 12 If the time that managers
devote to regulatory issues and litigation-related concerns significantly
exceeds the time that managers devote to business issues, the option to
go private becomes more attractive. A recent example of increased
regulatory burdens affecting the propensity of firms to go private is the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which several scholars argue has induced
smaller issuers to exit the market. 3
drivers of companies' decisions to go private between 1990 and 2007 was the failure to attract
sufficient investor interest. HAMID MEHRAN & STAVROS PERISTIANI, FED. RESERVE BANK OF
N.Y., FINANCIAL VISIBILITY AND THE DECISION TO Go PRIVATE (2009), available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr376.pdf.
12. The role of potential litigation associated with publicly-held status as a motivation for
going private has been recently investigated by Eric L. Talley, who observed that the effect of
governance changes aimed at reducing the risk of lawsuits in a public corporation seems to be
negligible. Eric L. Talley, Public Ownership, Firm Governance, and Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI.
L. REV. 335 (2009).
13. See, e.g., Ehud Kamar et al., Going-Private Decisions and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002: A Cross-Country Analysis, 25 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 107 (2009). For an article supporting the
hypothesis that the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) increased the costs and risks of
remaining public and positively affected going-private decisions, especially for smaller issuers,
see Robert P. Bartlett III, Going Private But Staying Public: Reexamining the Effect of Sarbanes-
Oxley on Firms' Going-Private Decisions, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 7 (2009). Professor Bartlett's article
starts from the observation that going-private transactions might require issuing high-yield debt
[Vol. 50:4
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Additionally, from an organizational and financial standpoint, the re-
duced separation between ownership and control that characterizes a
closely-held corporation (versus a publicly-held corporation) may dimi-
nish agency costs 14 and, under specific circumstances, improve the debt-
to-equity ratio of the firm. 15 Because most going-private transactions
imply a substitution of equity for debt, and because interest payments
are deductible while dividends are not, tax considerations also drive the
decision to go private, especially when high leverage is used. 16 As ar-
gued by Henderson and Epstein, "private-equity investors can increase
firm value (by reducing taxes) solely by using the firm's assets as colla-
teral to borrow money to buy out existing shareholders and to replace
their equity interests with debt.' 17 Clearly, however, the increased leve-
rage resulting from these transactions exposes the corporation to a high-
er risk of insolvency, and, thus, the decision to withdraw from public
markets must take into account the pros and cons of such a dramatic
change to the financial structure of the firm.18
In addition to the above mentioned "classical" rationales for going
private, Professors Masulis and Thomas offer a new and insightful ex-
planation focused on risk monitoring and the use of derivative instru-
instruments, with the consequence of maintaining the corporation subject to some provisions of
SOX even after it becomes private. Bartlett questions the effect of SOX on the number of going-
private transactions. More specifically, he tests whether going-private transactions after 2002
were structured without the issuance of high-yield securities and thereby avoided further applica-
tion of SOX. Bartlett found that there were a diminishing number of similar deals in the case of
smaller issuers, consistent with the hypothesis that SOX affected going-private decisions for
smaller, rather than larger, issuers. See also Carl R. Chen & Nancy Mohan, The Impact of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Firms Going Private, 19 RES. ACCT. REG. 119 (2007) (confirming the
impact of SOX on going private decisions of smaller issuers); Ellen Engel, Rachel M. Hayes &
Xue Wang, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Firms' Going-Private Decisions, 44 J. ACCT. & ECON.
116 (2007) (finding that SOX affected going private decisions). But see Christian Leuz, Was the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Really This Costly? A Discussion of Evidence from Event Returns
and Going-Private Decisions, 44 J. ACCT. & EcoN. 146 (2007) (doubting the positive correlation
between the enactment of SOX and an increase in going-private transactions).
14. See James C. Spindler, How Private is Private Equity, and at What Cost?, 76 U. CFH. L.
REv. 311 (2009).
15. Kenneth Lehn & Annette Poulsen, Free Cash Flow and Stockholder Gains in Going Pri-
vate Transactions, 44 J. FIN. 771 (1989).
16. Steven Kaplan, The Effects of Management Buyouts on Operating Performance and Val-
ue, 24 J. FN. ECON. 217 (1989); Steven Kaplan, Management Buyouts: Evidence on Taxes as a
Source of Value, 44 J. FIN. 611 (1989); Steven N. Kaplan, The Staying Power of Leveraged
Buyouts, 29 J. FN. ECON. 287 (1991).
17. M. Todd Henderson & Richard A. Epstein, The Going-Private Phenomenon: Causes and
Implications, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2 (2009).
18. Id. at 2-3.
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ments. 19 According to these authors, boards of publicly-held firms with
widespread ownership and low management shareholdings are ill
equipped to control complex trading in derivative instruments. Private
equity represents a specific response to this particular type of agency
problem because financially sophisticated controlling shareholders can
better monitor management derivatives by trading as a closely-held cor-
poration. This could be considered a particular case of the agency-
costs-reduction rationale discussed in the preceding paragraph, but it
seems particularly relevant in the current economic scenario vis-6-vis
the exponential increase in the use of financial derivatives.
Even this short list of reasons for going private suggests how, under
certain circumstances, opting out of public markets is a value-
maximizing transaction. Controlling shareholders and managers are
usually in the best position to evaluate when such circumstances occur.
By the same token, information asymmetries and collective action prob-
lems affecting the behavior of minority shareholders support the propo-
sition that legislatures should grant and regulate the right of the former
to freeze out the latter.
In regulating this issue, the most delicate problem is how the poten-
tial benefits of going private are split between controlling shareholders,
managers, and acquiring subjects on the one hand, and minority share-
holders and investors on the other. Freeze-out regulation is the way in
which policy makers address the efficiency and distributive justice con-
undrums that arise when a publicly held company goes private.
From the point of view of minority shareholders, going private can
turn their investment into a "lemon.",21 As the old saying goes, "if life
gives you lemons, make lemonade." But in the context of corporate
transactions, turning something sour into something sweet might not be
as easy as squeezing citrus fruits. When minority shareholders are
squeezed out, the controlling shareholder is largely in control of the
amount of sugar that the investors receive. The remainder of this Article
addresses how different legal rules affect the sugar-to-lemon ratio in a
freeze-out transaction.
19. Ronald W. Masulis & Randall S. Thomas, Does Private Equity Create Wealth? The Ef-
fects of Private Equity and Derivatives on Corporate Governance, 76 U. CHI. L. REv. 219 (2009).
20. Id. at 257-58.
21. Professors Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Marcel Kahan have made reference to a possible
"lemons effect" in going-private transactions. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, The
"Lemons Effect" in Corporate Freeze-Outs (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
6938, 1999), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract-id=226397.
[Vol. 50:4
FREEZE-OUTS
II. FREEZE-OUT TRANSACTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
A. A Roadmap
There are numerous combinations of transactions that allow control-
ling shareholders to appropriate the equity interests of minority share-
holders. In the United States, the different techniques are distilled into
four major categories: asset sales, reverse stock splits, (cash-out) mer-
gers, and tender offers.
In an asset sale, all or substantially all of the assets of the corporation
are sold to another corporation owned or controlled by the same subject
that controls the selling corporation, for consideration either in cash or
securities. Consequently, the selling corporation is either liquidated or
allowed to remain in existence but without control of its former assets.
An asset sale requires shareholders' consent, but a controlling share-
holder may have sufficient votes to unilaterally determine the transac-
tion. Such a scenario leaves minority shareholders with the limited
choice of either challenging the deal or exercising dissenters' rights,
when available.22
As the name suggests, a reverse stock split is the converse of a stock
split. The corporation adopts a resolution whereby a certain number of
outstanding shares is exchanged for one share of greater value. For ex-
ample, for every hundred shares at $2 par value each, the corporation
issues one single share at $200 par value. If the exchange ratio is high
enough, only the largest shareholders are entitled to obtain at least one
share and therefore maintain their participation in the company; mean-
while, the minority shareholders receive a cash equivalent to the value
of the fraction of a share to which they are entitled. Especially in the
case of a listed corporation with a widespread ownership structure, a re-
verse stock split is difficult to achieve and raises several grounds for lit-
igation.23
In the United States, asset sales and reverse stock splits are rarely
used to cash out minority shareholders. The two more common tech-
22. See generally JAMES D. Cox & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS 594 (2d ed. 2003)
(discussing the sale of a corporation's assets); FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 661
(2000); Rod J. Howard, Recent Case Law Developments Addressing Sales of 'All or Substantially
All' Assets, in DRAFTING CORPORATE AGREEMENTS 2004, at 243 (2004) (discussing more recent
developments in Delaware case law).
23. For a general discussion of reverse stock splits, see Elliot M. Kaplan & David B. Young,
Corporate 'Eminent Domain': Stock Redemption and Reverse Stock Splits, 57 UMKC L. REV. 67
(1988).
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niques are mergers and tender offers.2 4 More specifically, under Dela-
ware law, two approaches have become increasingly popular: the "long-
form merger," (or "one-step freeze-out") and the "tender-offer/short-
form merger" (or "two-step freeze-out"). 25 In the long-form merger,
controlling shareholders simply approve a merger in which the consid-
eration offered to minority shareholders is cash or other nonequity se-
curities, rather than shares of the surviving entity. The tender of-
fer/short-form merger, a more recent development, consists of two
steps: a voluntary tender offer on all the outstanding shares launched by
the parent corporation, generally aimed at acquiring at least 90% of the
outstanding shares, followed by a short-form, cash-out merger. Under
Delaware law (as well as that of most other jurisdictions), because the
controlling parent into which the subsidiary will be merged holds more
than 90% of the shares following the tender offer, the decision to cash
out remaining shareholders requires simply the approval of the board of
directors of the controlling corporation, thus obviating the vote of
shareholders of either corporation or of the directors of the subsidiary
corporation.26
The following pages will analyze these two forms of freeze outs. The
number of transactions in which one or the other is employed is substan-
tial. Between June 19, 2001 (when the Delaware Court of Chancery de-
cided In re Siliconix Inc. Shareholders Litigation,27 an important deci-
sion approving the two-step freeze-out) and December 31, 2003, ninety-
six listed Delaware corporations initiated freeze-out transactions where,
prior to the acquisition, controlling shareholders held between 35% and
90% of the voting shares-an average of thirty-eight transactions per
year.28 Of this sample, twenty-seven deals involved a two-step freeze-
out, and sixty-nine involved a one-step freeze-out.
29
Interestingly, even in the aftermath of Siliconix, traditional one-step
freeze-outs outpaced two-step freeze-outs at a rate of nearly two-to-one,
despite the fact that, on average, two-step freeze-outs precipitate lower
payments to minority shareholders. This result might be explained by
24. See Furlow, supra note 4, at 85; McGuinness & Rehbock, supra note 4, at 437-38; Ste-
velman, supra note 4, at 779.
25. Furlow, supra note 4, at 85; McGuinness & Rehbock, supra note 4, at 437-38.
26. Cox & HAZEN, supra note 22, at 601.
27. No. CV-A-18700, 2001 WL 716787 (Del. Ch. June 19, 2001).
28. Guhan Subramanian, Post-Siliconix Freeze-Outs: Theory and Evidence, 36 J. LEGAL
STuD. 1, 8 (2007).
29. Note that in two of these sixty-nine cases, minorities were forced out through a reverse
stock split rather than a cash-out merger.
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path dependency and legal consultants' lack of familiarity with the new
path forged by Siliconix.
30
B. Shareholders' Remedies Vis-d-Vis Cash-Out Mergers
The development of rules governing going-private transactions in the
United States is best understood when put in historical perspective. This
task is significantly simplified by concentrating on the evolution of
these rules in the state of Delaware, by far the most important jurisdic-
tion for the regulation of freeze-out transactions both quantitatively and
qualitatively.
3 1
Traditionally, in the United States and most jurisdictions outside the
United States, controlling shareholders could not forcefully cash out
minority shareholders. This common law rule, rooted in the contractual
nature of the corporate charter, erected several walls to protect the prop-
erty interests of minority equity investors from the will of directors and
majority stockholders. First, unanimity was required to approve any ma-
jor amendment to the corporate contract, including mergers and other
business combinations, thus granting each shareholder a veritable ve-
to.32 Legislatures and courts gradually realized, however, that in the
modern business environment, the costs and dangers of minority dicta-
torship outweighed the risk of majority abuse, and they started amend-
ing the economic and legal structure of publicly held corporations.33
Dissenting minority shareholders would be adequately (and more effi-
30. See id. at 10-11.
31. Delaware is not only the dominant state of incorporation for listed corporations, but also
the state whose law governs the choice-of-law and forum clauses of the vast majority of merger
agreements. See Robert Daimes, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1559, 1571 (2002) (finding that 77% of companies engaged in IPOs are incorporated under Dela-
ware law). Another study found that, in a sample of over one thousand merger agreements an-
nounced between 2004 and 2008, roughly two thirds of agreements chose Delaware for their go-
verning law and 60% opted for Delaware as their choice of forum-even in situations where
either the buyer or the target was not incorporated in Delaware. Matthew Cain & Steven M. Da-
vidoff, Delaware's Competitive Reach: An Empirical Analysis of Public Company Merger
Agreements 1 (August 18, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract- 1431625. According to the same study, Delaware faces some competi-
tion from New York, but it is not substantial (just 13% of the contracts opted to apply New York
law, and 10.8% opted for New York as a forum). Id. at 4.
32. For a comprehensive overview of the development of cash-out statutes in the United
States, see Elliott J. Weiss, The Law of Take Out Mergers: A Historical Perspective, 56 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 624 (1981). An account of the distinct but related issue of the earlier rules concerning share-
holders' voting rights, and in particular the evolution from a one-vote-per-shareholder to a one-
share, one-vote system, is offered in Colleen A. Dunlavy, Social Conceptions of the Corporation:
Insights from the History of Shareholder Voting Rights, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347 (2006).
33. See Weiss, supra note 32, at 626.
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ciently) protected through appraisal rights, which allowed minority
shares to be liquidated at a court-determined fair price. Statutory ap-
praisal rights were introduced in due course, 34 thus marking the first
step toward an entirely new vision of corporate law, emphasizing the fi-
nancial nature of minority investors' equity interests.
It would take one more step, however, before minority shareholders
could be cashed out rather than given shares of the surviving entity:
Florida was the first state to allow straight cash-out mergers (in 1925),
soon to be followed by the vast majority of jurisdictions.
35
Legislatures did not, however, leave minority shareholders without
recourse. Minority shareholders dissenting from a cash-out merger
could choose among an array of judicial remedies. A shareholder could
seek relief by alleging some form of illegality: lack of authority or abuse
of power, self dealing, failure to comply with state or federal statutory
requirements, etc. Such violations sustained actions at law or suits in
equity and led to remedies as diverse as injunctions, rescission, damag-
es, and claims under the securities laws for disclosure violations under
SEC Rule lOb-5 or Rule 14a-9 of the Exchange Act.36 Alternatively, as
previously mentioned, minority shareholders could invoke the right of
appraisal based on corporate statutes, which allowed dissenting share-
holders to receive payment of their shares' fair value through a judicial
procedure regulated by the legislature, without requiring proof of any
specific legal violation.
It is worth noting that some of the most relevant judge-made rules
shaping going-private transactions in the United States were established
in cases where shareholders sought legal or equitable relief, and that ap-
praisal rights are less often litigated in the cash-out merger context. Be-
fore proceeding further, it is necessary to understand why this is the
case.
34. See Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal's Role in Corpo-
rate Law, 84 GEO. L.J. 1, 15 (1995) (showing how, in most states, appraisal statutes followed with
some delay the introduction of statutory rules authorizing mergers approved by less than a un-
animous vote).
35. Weiss, supra note 4, at 8; Alexander Khutorsky, Note, Coming in From the Cold: Re-
forming Shareholders'Appraisal Rights in Freeze-out Transactions, 1997 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
133, 139 n.32. See generally Weiss, supra note 32.
36. For a synthetic but complete discussion of the major remedies, other than the appraisal
right, available to minority shareholders dissenting from a merger or other business combinations,
see COX & HAZEN, supra note 22, at 617.
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C. Appraisal Rights and Their Limits
Professor Robert Thompson points out that the use of appraisal rights
as a check against conflicted transactions (including freeze outs) is a
relatively recent development.37 As originally designed, appraisal rights
sought to counterbalance the shift from shareholders' unanimous con-
sent as a precondition to fundamental corporate changes, to a simple or
qualified majority consent.38 They offered protection to dissenting mi-
nority shareholders, particularly in the situation of a merger between in-
dependent firms and in the absence of an active market for the shares.
Given this specific goal, legislatures drafted appraisal statutes to serve
what Professor Thompson describes as a "liquidity purpose"39--to en-
sure that minority shareholders were not imprisoned in the new corpora-
tion that resulted from the transaction. In other words, legislatures ba-
lanced minority protection with efficiency considerations in an attempt
to prevent one disgruntled shareholder from vetoing a value-maximizing
deal.
In light of this historical origin, appraisal rights were, and still are, ill-
suited for the protection of minority shareholders faced with a cash-
out.40 More specifically, from the minority shareholder's point of view,
appraisal rights are unattractive for four reasons: (1) scope of applica-
tion of statutory relief, (2) procedural requirements, (3) accepted valua-
37. Thompson, supra note 34, at 16.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 29.
40. More generally, appraisal rights did not always achieve the goal of adequately protecting
dissenting minorities in the light of their scope of application. Similar business combinations can
often be achieved through different procedures, mergers being only one of them. For example,
Corporation A might purchase all the assets of Corporation B in exchange for shares ofA. Subse-
quently, B can dissolve and liquidate the stock of its shareholders, distributing the shares of A re-
ceived as consideration for the sale. The substantive result is the same as a merger of B into A, but
the formal procedure is not a merger. In jurisdictions like Delaware, where no statutory dissen-
ters' rights are triggered by the sale of assets, minority shareholders cannot invoke this particular
remedy. In this situation, courts applying Delaware law would not interpret this as a de facto
merger because Delaware's jurisprudence follows the "independent statutory significance" doc-
trine, in which appraisal is not available when the statute governing the particular transaction at
hand does not explicitly provide for appraisal. The leading Delaware case adopting this view and
ruling that appraisal rights are not available in a sale of assets is Hariton v. Arco Elecs., Inc., 182
A.2d 22 (Del. Ch. 1962). A famous earlier example of a jurisdiction embracing the defacto mer-
ger doctrine is the Pennsylvania case Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 143 A.2d 25 (Pa. 1958). In reac-
tion to this decision, however, the Pennsylvania legislature explicitly revoked the doctrine, thus
making appraisal rights unavailable in a sale of assets, even if the effect of the transaction is sub-
stantially equivalent to a cash-out merger. See 15 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1105, 1904 (2009).
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tion techniques of dissenters' shares, and (4) other litigation-related
problems.4' I address each reason in turn.
1. Scope of Application
Generally, the right of appraisal is not uniformly applicable to all
mergers. Delaware provides for a "market exemption" from appraisal
rights when the shares of the corporation are listed or widely dis-
bursed.42 The rationale for the exemption is that, presumptively, share-
holders can easily sell their shares on the market at a fair price 43 and
therefore are not entitled to initiate lengthy and expensive procedures in
court to assess an already-monetized value. This exception clearly re-
flects the liquidity goal of early appraisal statutes, but it fails to provide
relief to dissenting minority shareholders facing cash-out as a result of
conflicted transactions. In such a context, the fair value of the shares
might be significantly higher than the cash consideration offered by
controlling shareholders. Alternatively, the market price might not re-
flect the shares' fair value because it has discounted for the possibility
of a majority freeze-out. For these very reasons, Delaware adopts an
"exception to the exemption," where cash-out mergers are carved out
for special treatment, and minority shareholders are afforded their ap-
praisal day in court.a n Many other states, however, do not provide for
such an "exception to the exemption," thus ruling out altogether the
possibility of invoking dissenters' rights when a listed corporation is
taken private.45
2. Procedural Requirements
Complicated procedural requirements are another reason why ap-
praisal remedies are rarely invoked by minority shareholders. Dela-
41. On the problems of the appraisal remedy, in addition to the previously cited work by
Thompson, supra note 34, at 28-52, see Joel Seligman, Reappraising the Appraisal Remedy, 52
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 829 (1984), and Barry M. Wertheimer, The Shareholders'Appraisal Reme-
dv and How Courts Determine Fair Value, 47 DUKE L.J. 613 (1998).
42. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.02(b)(1) (2002).
43. For its legal relevance, see Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). For a description
of the concept of efficient markets and its regulatory implications, see Christopher Paul Saari, The
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the Regulation of the Securities In-
dustry, 29 STAN. L. REv. 1031 (1977). For more recent commentary, see William T. Allen, Secur-
ities Markets as Social Products: The Pretty Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 28 J. CORP. L.
551 (2003).
44. Thompson, supra note 34, at 30. Thompson indicates that about half of the states do not
grant appraisal rights when a market for the corporation's shares exists. Id. at 10, 29.
45. Id. at 30.
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ware's appraisal rights statutes provide that dissenting shareholders
must, among other things, notify the corporation of their intention to
dissent before the shareholders' meeting that triggers the right, explicit-
ly dissent (or at least abstain) at the meeting, and comply with further
notification requirements following the meeting. These steps impose
meaningful burdens on the minority. Often it is difficult for investors to
"anticipate" their dissent before the meeting, and procedural compliance
raises transaction costs for good-faith minority shareholders that are be-
ing unfairly cashed out.
46
3. Valuation Techniques
Additionally, dissenters' shares might be intentionally undervalued,
particularly in the context of a self-dealing cash-out merger. Traditional
appraisal statutes provide that dissenting shareholders can be cashed out
without considering the merger's potential positive effects on shares'
value, the so-called "post-acquisition gains."47 Once again, this ap-
proach makes sense when a fully informed minority, having had the op-
tion to obtain shares of the surviving corporation, freely decides to li-
quidate its investment through appraisal. But when minority sharehold-
shareholders are not given this option, and are instead forced out at a
price unilaterally determined by the controlling shareholders or direc-
tors, it is unfair to ignore post-acquisition gains. In fact, several states
have abandoned rigid valuation formulas and allow for these elements
to be considered in a take-out merger. The Supreme Court of Delaware
followed this course of action in 1983 in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,48 and
in the early 1980s, New York amended its statute to permit considering
post-acquisition gains in a merger context.49 The 1984 version of the
Mobel Business Corporation Act (MBCA) provided that post-
acquisition gains should be excluded except when it would be inequita-
ble, but the current version of the Act simply states that for appraisal
purposes "fair value" should be determined "immediately before the ef-
fectuation of the corporate action to which the shareholder objects. 5°
Notwithstanding these qualifications, minority shareholders face at least
the possibility that, in an appraisal procedure, the benefits of the very
46. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2010).
47. Id. at 35-36.
48. 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983).
49. Thompson, supra note 34, at 36.
50. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.01(4)(i) (2002).
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transaction from which they are locked out will not be accounted for
when their shares are valued.
A second drawback in terms of valuation is that it is doubtful whether
appraisal valuations include recovery for damages caused by abuse of
power or breach of fiduciary duties.51
But the inadequacy of the appraisal remedy in terms of share valua-
tion is even more striking when compared with the possible outcome of
a challenge to the cash-out merger based on breach of fiduciary duties
or other illegalities-an alternative remedy available to minority share-
holders. As a leading hornbook puts it:
[I]n case of breach of fiduciary duty, the Chancery Court might
order a "rescissory" measure of damages-in other words, in-
stead of measuring damages based upon the difference between
what the minority shareholders received in the merger, and the
value of the minority's stock at the time of the merger, the court
might award damages based upon the difference between what
the minority shareholders received, and the value of the stock at
the time of the damage award. If the provable value of the minor-
ity's interest increases after the majority forces out the minority,




Finally, appraisal procedures can be lengthy and expensive, with in-
dividual plaintiffs bearing most of the costs, including attorney and ex-
pert fees.53 By way of contrast, it is worth noting that a suit for breach
of fiduciary duty can be brought as a class action, whereby the potential
measure of damages is larger than the appraisal value (and therefore ap-
pealing to lawyers operating on a contingency basis), and even dissent-
ing shareholders that fail to formally exercise their rights are entitled to
the relief.
54
51. See Rapid-Am. Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 805 (Del. 1992) ("[A] court cannot assign
value to any 'speculative' events arising out of the merger or consolidation."). But see Cavalier
Oil Corp. v. Hamett, 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989) (holding that a corporate opportunity claim
could be asserted in appraisal proceedings).
52. GEVURTZ, supra note 22, at 737.
53. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 13.31 (b).
54. In Delaware, class appraisal procedures are not authorized by statute. See DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (2010); see also Gilson & Gordon, supra note 4, at 799.
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D. Challenging Cash-Out Mergers: How Litigation Shaped Freeze-
Out Techniques
The Delphic ambiguity55 surrounding the potential outcome of an ap-
praisal procedure, coupled with rules that are not tailored to the specific
features of self-dealing transactions, render appraisal rights an ineffec-
tive protection for minority shareholders facing cash-out. Therefore,
minority shareholders often challenge a merger on the basis of some il-
legality, in particular for breach of directors' fiduciary duties or disclo-
sure violations of federal securities laws.56 The bulk of cases that shape
the law of going-private transactions in the United States deal with these
types of allegations.
Before discussing the most recent Delaware case law, it is worth not-
ing that in many jurisdictions the "business purpose requirement" serves
as the preliminary protection for minority shareholders against unfair
cash-out.57 Under this standard, a cash-out merger is permissible only
when the merger presents a valuable economic purpose (other than the
elimination of minority equity investors). Delaware, however, aban-
doned the business purpose requirement in Weinberger.
58
Lacking the business purpose requirement, Delaware courts frequent-
ly adjudicate minority shareholders' claims of breach of fiduciary du-
ties, or other illegalities, in connection with cash-out transactions. In de-
ciding these disputes, Delaware courts have attempted to balance the
power of the directors and the majority shareholders on one hand with
the protection of minority shareholders on the other. Too much of the
latter prevents efficient, value-maximizing transactions, whereas too
much of the former leads to injustice. Courts are frequently reluctant to
grapple with elusive standards of substantive fairness, particularly be-
cause the legislature has already attempted to strike the balance through
procedural protections. Notwithstanding the complexity of the issue,
courts have weighed in, and the resulting legal framework is illustrated
55. The expression is borrowed from Mary Siegel, Back to the Future: Appraisal Rights in
the Twenty-First Century, 32 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 79, 93 (1995).
56. For a brief description of Rule 13e-3, promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission in 1979 to impose specific disclosure obligations in a going-private transaction, see
Koening, supra note 11, at 524.
57. See Alpert v. 28 Williams St. Corp., 473 N.E.2d 19, 28 (1984) (holding that freeze-out
mergers are only acceptable when in advancement of general corporate interest). For the relev-
ance of New York in terms of choice-of-law and forum clauses in merger agreements, see Daines,
supra note 31, at 1571.
58. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
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through seven leading cases, each of which adds to the mosaic of regu-
lation governing going-private transactions. These cases are: Weinberg-
er v. UOP, Inc.,59 Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co.,60 Kahn v. Lynch Commu-
nication Systems, Inc.,61 Solomon v. Pathe Communications Corp.,62 In
re Siliconix Inc. Shareholders Litigation,63 Glassman v. Unocal Explo-
ration Corp.,64 and In re Pure Resources, Inc., Shareholders Litiga-
tion.6 5 The first three cases dealt with long-form mergers; the last four
addressed short-form mergers.
E. Delaware Case Law on Challenges to Long-Form Cash-Out
Mergers from Weinberger to Getty Oil
In Weinberger, UOP, a subsidiary of Signal Companies (Signal,
holding 50.5% of the outstanding voting shares), was merged into the
parent corporation through a long-form, cash-out merger. Dissenting
minority shareholders refused cash consideration and brought a class ac-
tion suit against the subsidiary and the parent, directors of the two com-
panies, and the investment bank Lehman Brothers, challenging the fair-
ness of the transaction and seeking injunctive relief or, alternatively,
monetary damages.
The key factual issues leading to approval of the merger are worth
recounting. In the early 1980s, Signal sought investment opportunities.
After considering different alternatives, the company's board of direc-
tors concluded that the best option was to acquire the totality of shares
of its subsidiary, UOP, through a cash-out merger. Signal's executive
committee informed James V. Crawford, UOP's president, CEO, and
long-time Signal group executive, of this intention and quoted a price
per share between $20 and $21. Evidence at trial showed that, during
the discussion, Crawford agreed that the price was fair but concentrated
his attention on the consequences of the acquisition for personnel. Fol-
lowing this conversation, Signal's board of directors approved a merger
proposal offering $21 per share to minority shareholders, a figure signif-
icantly above market price, which fluctuated around $15. The proposal
provided that the merger would be completed only if it satisfied a
double condition: the totality of the votes cast in favor of the merger
59. Id.
60. 493 A.2d 929 (Del. 1985).
61. 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994).
62. 672 A.2d 35 (Del. 1996).
63. No. CV-A-18700, 2001 WL 716787 (Del. Ch. June 19, 2001).
64. 777 A.2d 242 (Del. 2001).
65. 808 A.2d 421 (Del. Ch. 2002).
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would be greater than or equal to two-thirds of the entire voting capital,
and a majority of the minority shareholders (constituting 49.5% of all
shares) would vote in favor.
The UOP board approved these terms and recommended the merger.
In making its decision, the board relied upon, among other things, a
fairness opinion issued by Lehman Brothers, which, at trial, the court
determined to have been hastily prepared. The trial also revealed that
two UOP directors (who were also employees of the acquiring corpora-
tion Signal), had prepared a report quoting a price of up to $24 as a
"good investment" for Signal. This higher price would have had minor
consequences on the financial structure of the deal for Signal, but would
have created substantial additional benefit for UOP's shareholders. The
report was never disclosed to UOP's outside directors and was only
shared with Signal's board.
Notwithstanding the revelation of the $24 per share recommendation,
the Chancery Court considered the merger fair and found for the defen-
dants. On appeal, however, the Supreme Court of Delaware reversed the
lower court's ruling and took the occasion to discuss, and partially re-
solve, several different issues, including share evaluation techniques.
66
Weinberger held that under Delaware law, as in other U.S. jurisdic-
tions, freeze-out transactions conducted by controlling shareholders
amount to self-dealing. Thus, freeze-out transactions are subject to "en-
tire fairness" review. The decision explored the concept of entire fair-
ness in the merger context, arguing that it encompasses both "fair deal-
ing" and "fair price." The former is a procedural element, concerned
with the way in which the acquisition is negotiated; the latter is a subs-
tantive element, taking into account the economic rationale behind the
deal.67
66. On the different important contributions of this decision, among the first comments, see
Weiss, supra note 4; Robert K. Payson & Gregory A. Inskip, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.: Its Prac-
tical Significance in the Planning and Defense of Cash-Out Mergers, 8 DEL. J. CORP. L. 83
(1983); William Prickett & Michael Hanrahan, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.: Delaware's Effort to
Preserve a Level Playing Field for Cash-Out Mergers, 8 DEL. J. CORP. L. 59 (1983); Carol B.
Haigt, Note, The Standard of Care Required of an Investment Banker to Minority Shareholders in
a Cash-Out Merger: Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 8 DEL. J. CORP. L. 98 (1983).
67. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) ("The concept of fairness has
two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price. The former embraces questions of when the transac-
tion was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how the
approvals of the directors and the stockholders were obtained. The latter aspect of fairness relates
to the economic and financial considerations of the proposed merger, including all relevant fac-
tors: assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, and any other elements that affect the intrin-
sic or inherent value of a company's stock.").
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The most relevant part of the decision for the current analysis, how-
ever, is dicta buried in a footnote, where the Supreme Court of Dela-
ware proscribed the means by which the entire fairness requirement
would be met: the corporation considering a cash-out merger should ap-
point a special committee of independent directors, entrusted with the
task of negotiating the merger at arm's length.68
The court's laconic observation stirred a theoretical debate. Suppor-
ters of outside directors' ability to ensure truly independent decisions in
the best interest of all shareholders clashed with critics that doubted the
efficacy of a special committee with veto powers.69 At a more practical
level, however, many corporations soon followed the path pointed out
by Weinberger, and litigation erupted on the precise consequences of
the committee's approval.
Two answers were possible, and the judges of the Delaware Chan-
cery Court split. By one approach, the committee's decision would be
measured by the "business judgment rule." In other words, the resolu-
tion of the independent directors would be presumed to have been made
on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the ac-
tion was in the best interest of the corporation.7 0 Alternatively, the spe-
cial committee's decision would simply shift the burden to the plaintiff
to prove the absence of entire fairness. 71 This school of thought was
more favorable to plaintiffs because to prove that a transaction is not en-
tirely fair, either for lack of fair dealing or fair price, is less cumbersome
than overcoming the highly deferential business judgment rule.
The Delaware Supreme Court addressed the issue left open in Wein-
berger in two pivotal cases: Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil72 and Kahn v.
Lynch.73 In both decisions, and under different circumstances, the court
embraced the view that if merging companies complied with specific
procedural safeguards intended to protect minority shareholders, review
68. Id. at 709.
69. Among the authors arguing that the members of the special committee entrusted with the
task of negotiating the merger can hardly be independent from the controlling shareholder is for-
mer Delaware Chancellor William T. Allen. See William T. Allen et al., Function over Form: A
Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287, 1308
(2001).
70. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995); In re Trans World Air-
lines, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 9844, 1988 WL 111271 (Del. Ch. 1988).
71. Citron v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490 (Del. Ch. 1990); Rabkin v. Olin
Corp., No. 164, 1990 WL 47648 (Del. Ch. 1990).
72. 493 A.2d 929 (Del. 1985).
73. 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994).
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would be limited to the entire fairness test, with the burden of proof
transferred from the defendant to the plaintiff.
Getty Oil settled the question concerning the effect of a majority of
the minority shareholders' approval of a merger. In the 1960s, Getty
Oil, an oil behemoth created by Jean Paul Getty, became a majority
stockholder of Skelly, another big player in the industry, owning direct-
ly 7.42% of the outstanding voting shares, and indirectly, through its
controlled subsidiary Mission, an additional 72.6%. Jean Paul Getty op-
posed any further integration between the two companies, believing that
a certain degree of competition between them was beneficial to their
own strength and profitable for the shareholders.74 Soon after his death,
however, Getty Oil's executive vice-president, Harold E. Berg, con-
tacted Skelly President James H. Hara to discuss combining Getty Oil,
Skelly, and Mission.
The directors of Skelly and Getty Oil engaged in an extensive hard-
bargaining process to determine the proper exchange ratio for outstand-
ing stock. Skelly's representatives were very determined to obtain the
best possible conditions for their shareholders, focusing extensively on
the application of the Delaware Block Method.75 Eventually, the boards
agreed on an exchange ratio of 0.5875 Getty Oil shares for every Skelly
share. With the boards' unanimous approval, the deal was submitted to
the shareholders of the corporations involved and conditioned on the
approval of the majority of the minority stockholders. Almost 90% of
the minority shares present at the meeting, representing 58% of all the
outstanding minority shares, voted in favor of integration, which was
subsequently completed. The merger was, however, challenged by dis-
gruntled Skelly shareholders, who brought a class action suit claiming
the exchange ratio was unfair. After a lengthy and complicated trial, the
Chancery Court found the deal entirely fair and entered judgment for
the defendants. On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed.
Applying Weinberger, the Delaware Supreme Court evaluated issues
of both fair dealing and fair price. Its decision offers an insightful dis-
cussion of the Delaware Block Method and proper disclosure of all ma-
terial facts in a proxy statement. For current purposes, however, it re-
solved what significance should be attributed to the minority
shareholders' vote:
74. This is quite in line with the Darwinian view embedded in one of Getty's oft-quoted lines:
"The meek shall inherit the earth, but not its mineral rights." Euan Ferguson, Big Money Given
With Good Grace, SCOT. ON SUNDAY, Aug. 14,1994, at 4.
75. Rosenblatt, 493 A.2d at 936.
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Clearly, Getty, as majority shareholder of Skelly, stood on both
sides of this transaction and bore the initial burden of establish-
ing its entire fairness. However, approval of a merger, as here, by
an informed vote of a majority of the minority shareholders,
while not a legal prerequisite, shifts the burden of proving the
unfairness of the merger entirely to the plaintiffs.76
Utilizing this procedural protection simply shifted the burden of
proving the fairness of the transaction. It did not alter the standard of re-
view to the business judgment rule, with its more deferential treatment
of managers and its less favorable disposition towards minority share-
holders.
In Kahn v. Lynch, decided nine years after Getty Oil, the Delaware
Supreme Court reached a consistent conclusion where the procedural
protection afforded minority shareholders was approval of the merger
by a committee of independent directors.
77
In Kahn, Alcatel, holding almost 44% of Lynch, pursued a freeze-out
merger with Lynch, whose board of directors instituted a special com-
mittee to negotiate the terms of the acquisition. Alcatel proposed a cash
price for minorities of $14 per share; Lynch representatives countered at
$17. Finally, the board endorsed a price of $15.50 per share, but only
after Alcatel executives informed the committee that they were consi-
dering a hostile tender offer directly to minority shareholders at a lower
price.
The Chancery Court ruled that the negotiation between the acquiring
corporation and the special committee was, in fact, conducted at arm's
length, and that the burden of proving unfairness of the $15.50 price
therefore shifted to the plaintiffs. Moreover, the court concluded that the
plaintiffs had not satisfied their burden. On appeal, the Delaware Su-
preme Court reversed but, in doing so, endorsed the general rule that
approval by an independent committee shifted the onus of proving un-
fairness to the plaintiff. Having subscribed to this view, the court none-
theless considered what effect the threat of a hostile tender offer had on
the directors' ability to negotiate independently and determined that the
plaintiffs had made a prima facie showing of unfairness. Simply put, the
directors' capitulation in the face of a possible hostile tender offer be-
lied their ability to operate independently and to adequately protect the
interests of minority shareholders. The case was therefore remanded to
76. Id. at 937 (citation omitted).
77. 638 A.2d 1110, 1121 (Del. 1994).
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the lower court, with the burden of proving entire fairness shifted back
to the defendant.78
Thus, by the mid-nineties, Delaware case law on long-form, freeze-
out mergers was well settled. As in any arm' s-length transaction, courts
would review a merger conducted by controlling shareholders against
the two-pronged entire fairness test (Weinberger). Under normal entire
fairness review, the defendants shoulder the burden of proving fairness.
However, in the context of a freeze-out where certain procedural protec-
tions are afforded to minority shareholders-for example, when there is
approval by a truly independent special committee (Lynch), or approval
by the majority of the minority stockholders (Getty)-the burden of
proving unfairness shifts to the plaintiff.
79
This doctrinal framework has been applied extensively and consis-
tently, even if more recent decisions have added further specifications
and, in some cases, suggested possible reforms.
80
F. Tender Offers Followed by Short-Form Mergers from Pathe to
Pure
The second technique used to achieve a freeze-out of minority share-
holders, the tender-offer followed by a short-form merger, was antic-
ipated by Alcatel's alleged threat in Kahn v. Lynch to launch a tender
offer directly to the shareholders, bypassing the board of directors. The
essential question for a court to consider in such a situation is
straightforward: When a majority shareholder launches a public bid to
purchase the outstanding minority shares of a controlled corporation, is
the offer subject to the entire fairness standard?
In 1996, the Delaware Supreme Court answered in the negative. 81 So-
lomon v. Pathe Communications Corp. involved a complex financial
78. Doubts on the relevance of the alleged threat by Alcatel have been raised by Professor
Subramanian. See Subramanian, supra note 4, at 15.
79. Professor Subramanian criticizes the fact that combining both approval by a special com-
mittee of independent directors and a majority of the minority provision does not lighten the posi-
tion of the acquiring corporation. Id. at 16; see also infra note 80 (observing how this reform pro-
posal has been given consideration in a recent Delaware decision by Vice Chancellor Strine).
80. See, e.g., In re Cox Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604 (Del. Ch. 2005); In re
Cysive, Inc. S'holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531 (Del. Ch. 2003). In In re Cox, Vice Chancellor Strine
observed that "each Lynch case has settlement value, not necessarily because of its merits but be-
cause it cannot be dismissed." 879 A.2d at 605. In fact, the standard of review of entire fairness
exposes defendants to the time and expense of discovery. Strine's proposal, therefore, is that
when approval by both disinterested directors and shareholders (a majority of the minority) is
present, the standard of review should shift to the business judgment rule, and the plaintiff should
have to plead with particularity the facts supporting a breach of fiduciary duties.
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transaction with global ramifications.82 Pathe financed its acquisition of
the movie company MGM/UA with loans from the Dutch bank Credit
Lyonnaise Banque Nederland N.V. (CLBN). The loans were guaranteed
by security interests in 89% of Pathe's shares and 98% of MGM/UA
shares. CLBN also obtained control over 89.5% of Pathe's shares
through voting trusts. Not long after the acquisition, CLBN voted to re-
move four Pathe directors, among them CEO Giancarlo Parretti. An
Italian court found Parretti's removal improper, and while the legal
grounds and possible consequences of the ruling in the United States
were unclear, CLBT nonetheless decided to foreclose its security. Pathe
and CLBN reached an agreement pursuant to which the former would
not delay the foreclosure, and the latter would extend an offer to buy the
publicly held shares of Pathe for $1.50 per share. A committee of inde-
pendent directors approved the merger, supported by financial and legal
advisors.
The likely motivation for Pathe's directors to launch a tender offer on
all the shares was to reduce potential liabilities toward shareholders.
Nonetheless, Solomon, representing the class of Pathe's shareholders
that tendered the shares, brought suit alleging that the directors breached
their duty of care in failing to resist the foreclosure and not negotiating
effectively the price of the tender offer. This second failure, according
to the plaintiff, also represented a breach of the directors' duty of fair
dealing.
The Delaware Supreme Court confirmed the Chancery Court's deci-
sion, rejecting the plaintiff's theory:
In the case of totally voluntary tender offers, as here, courts do
not impose any right of the shareholders to receive a particular
price. Delaware law recognizes that, as to allegedly voluntary
tender offers (in contrast to cash-out mergers), the determinative
factor as to voluntariness is whether coercion is present, or
whether there is [sic] "materially false or misleading disclosures
made to shareholders in connection with the offer.,
83
The decision came as a surprise to the legal community. Prior to So-
lomon, the common understanding was that a tender offer launched by a
controlling shareholder presented a conflict of interest and was, there-
81. See Solomon v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., 672 A.2d 35 (Del. 1996).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 39 (citations omitted) (citing Eisenberg v. Chi. Milwaukee Corp., 537 A.2d 1051,
1056 (Del. Ch. 1987)).
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fore, subject to the entire fairness requirement.84 This point of view em-
phasized the role of the board of directors of the subsidiary in negotiat-
ing the terms of the bid with the parent corporation. The court reasoned,
however, that the two parties of the deal are the bidder on the one hand,
and the minority shareholders on the other. They are unrelated parties
and, in the absence of coercion and disclosure violations, single inves-
tors are free to accept or refuse the proposed price.85
Notwithstanding the very specific facts of Solomon, transactional
lawyers and their clients started to consider tender offers a less trea-
cherous pathway for the elimination of minorities than the traditional
long-form cash-out merger. Any remaining doubts were eliminated by
the Delaware Supreme Court's holdings in In re Siliconix Inc. Share-
holders Litigation86 and Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp.,87 both
decided in 2001.
In Siliconix, the vice-chancellor determined that a bidder voluntarily
launching a tender offer followed by a short-form merger is not obliged
to offer a fair price. Siliconix Inc. was active in the semiconductors in-
dustry and listed on the NASDAQ. Vishay, listed on the New York
Stock Exchange, was its controlling shareholder, with an 80.4% equity
interest. In 2000, the market price of Siliconix's shares was subject to
significant volatility, hitting a low in December. The company's funda-
mentals were also looking grim: sales and profits were decreasing at an
alarming rate.
In February 2001, Vishay proposed a cash tender offer on Siliconix
for $28.82 per share. The quoted price included a 10% premium over
the market price. Vishay also announced that if it reached a 90% con-
trolling stake, it would proceed to merge Siliconix into one of its subsid-
iaries through a short-form, cash-out merger at the same $28.82 price.
Siliconix's board appointed a two-member special committee to eva-
luate the offer. Although questions were raised on the actual indepen-
dence of the committee's members because of their relationships with
the controlling stockholder, the committee found that the price offered
was inadequate. By then, Siliconix's shares had risen above $28.82.
When the committee rejected the initial offer, Vishay started consi-
dering a less financially burdensome stock-for-stock offerwhich was
84. Subramanian, supra note 4, at 9.
85. In re Siliconix Inc. S'holders Litig., No. CV-A-18700, 2001 WL 716787, at *6 (Del. Ch.
June 19, 2001) ("[A]s long as the tender offer is pursued properly, the free choice of the minority
shareholders to reject the tender offer provides sufficient protection.").
86. 2001 WL 716787.
87. 777 A.2d 242 (Del. 2001).
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announced in May 2001, with no opportunity provided for the special
committee to evaluate the fairness of the transaction. The exchange ratio
was calculated simply by dividing the price of Siliconix and Vishay
shares on February 22, 2001, and was fixed at 1.5 Vishay shares for
each Silixonix share. No premium above the market price was consi-
dered.
In the public disclosure documents concerning the acquisition, Vi-
shay included a majority of the minority nonwaivable condition, stating
that the offer would be finalized only if a majority of the nonaffiliated
investors tendered their securities. In addition, Vishay informed the
public that, following the offer, it might proceed to a cash-out short-
form merger for the same consideration offered in the bid, but specified
that it would follow through only if certain conditions were met. Silico-
nix, on the other hand, stated in its Schedule 14D-9 form that the special
committee was neutral with respect to the offer, not having issued a rec-
ommendation. It also declared that no fairness opinion had been pro-
vided by an outside financial advisor.
Raymond L. Fitzgerald, a qualified minority shareholder holding 6%
of Siliconix's outstanding shares, sued asserting individual claims both
on his own behalf and on behalf of a class of Siliconix's minority share-
holders. He also filed a derivative action on behalf of the corporation
seeking, in particular, to enjoin the transaction.
Relying on Solomon, the court denied Fitzgerald's petitions. For the
purpose of this Article, however, it is sufficient to note that the court
distinguished mergers (where corporate boards are the primary negotia-
tors, with extensive power to structure and bring forward the deal) from
tender offers (where the counterpart to the bidder consists of minority
shareholders with power to decline the proposal if inadequate). In other
words, the tender offer does not entail the conflicts of interest that arise
when directors and officers elected by the controlling acquiring corpora-
tion promulgate a merger. On this basis, the court determined that a ten-
der offer is not subject to entire fairness review.
88
Siliconix focused on the front-end of the new freeze-out technique,
the tender offer. In contrast, Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp. ad-
88. This finding of the court is somehow troubling. In fact, Vishay announced that Siliconix
could be de-listed if the short-form merger was not completed, a circumstance that the court dis-
misses simply as "not threatening or coercive but, instead, . . the disclosure of a potential (and
undeniably adverse) consequence to those shareholders who do not tender, if the tender is suc-
cessful." Siliconix, 2001 WL 716787, at *16. It is undeniable that a similar possibility, and its
announcement, puts significant pressure to tender on the individual minority shareholder.
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dressed the back-end, the subsequent short-form, cash-out merger. 89 In
fact, no tender offer ever took place in Glassman. When Unocal in-
itiated the short-form merger of its subsidiary UXC, it already owned
96% of UXC's outstanding shares and proceeded directly to the short-
form merger pursuant to Section 253 of the Delaware General Corpora-
tion Law (DGCL). 90 Dissenting minority shareholders brought a class
action suit alleging an unfair exchange ratio.
Crucially, the court considered the statutory procedure for a short-
form merger set forth by Section 253 inherently incompatible with
equitable relief based on entire fairness review. In a short-form merger,
the board of directors and the shareholders of the merged subsidiary
have no voice, are not involved in the decision, and do not even receive
advance notice of the transaction. This exceptionally truncated process,
which allows the parent company's board of directors to unilaterally de-
termine the transaction, is based on a clear policy rationale: the relative-
ly small dimension of minority interests fails to justify a lengthy and
more costly procedure, such as that required in a long-form merger. In
the court's own words:
The equitable claim plainly conflicts with the statute. If a corpo-
rate fiduciary follows the truncated process authorized by § 253,
it will not be able to establish the fair dealing prong of entire
fairness. If, instead, the corporate fiduciary sets up negotiating
committees, hires independent financial and legal experts, etc.,
then it will have lost the very benefit provided by the statute-a
simple, fast and inexpensive process for accomplishing a merger.
We resolve this conflict by giving effect the intent of the General
Assembly. In order to serve its purpose, § 253 must be construed
to obviate the requirement to establish entire fairness.
9 1
Applying its own precedents, the court reasoned that, in the specific
context of a short-form merger, minorities are sufficiently protected by
the appraisal remedy available to "dissenting" shareholders even if
technically they do not vote and, therefore, cannot "dissent" in the gen-
eral sense. Equitable relief through an entire fairness claim is therefore
not available in the context of short-form mergers.92
89. 777 A.2d 242 (Del. 2001).
90. Codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253.
91. Glassman, 777 A.2d at 247-48.
92. See Stevelman, supra note 4, at 799 ("[tIn its Glassman decision, the Delaware Supreme
Court held that fiduciary fair dealings criteria are inapplicable to short-form mergers.").
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Siliconix and Glassman combined to clear the way for going-private
transactions through a tender offer followed by a short-form merger:
neither of the two components of the transaction would be subject to the
demanding standard of entire fairness.
The resulting doctrinal picture was subject to criticism, particularly
by academics. Two types of transactions aimed at the same substantive
result of eliminating minority shareholders-the long-form merger and
the tender-offer followed by a short-form merger-were held to radical-
ly different standards of review. One-step mergers (i.e., long-form mer-
gers) were subject to the entire fairness standard, more protective of mi-
nority investors. Two-step mergers (i.e., tender offers/short-form
mergers), however, were subject to the pro-manager business judgment
rule absent proof of coercion and disclosure violations.
In 2002, with In re Pure Resources, the Chancery Court attempted to
reconcile these differences by establishing further protections for minor-
ity shareholders in two-step mergers. 93 In Pure, Unocal, the controlling
shareholder of the corporation that gives its name to the case, launched
a stock-for-stock tender offer on the common stock of its subsidiary.
The exchange offer, as in Siliconix, was conditioned on the majority of
the minority nonaffiliated shareholders tendering their shares and was
also subject to the waivable condition that Unocal secure at least 90% of
all Pure shares before it initiated a short-form merger pursuant to DGCL
Section 253. Unocal also stated that it would proceed with the merger as
soon as possible after completion of the tender offer, at the same ex-
change ratio as the front-end offer.
The special committee instituted by Pure to evaluate the transaction
prepared a 14D-9 communication recommending that minority share-
holders not tender their shares. A class action followed, with dissenting
minority shareholders seeking to enjoin the transaction. The plaintiffs
proffered the usual argument: The offer did not meet the entire fairness
standard because it was coercive and material information was not
properly disclosed.
The court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, enjoining the offer. For the
purpose of this Article, it is relevant that the court, for the first time, dis-
tinguished clearly between the one-step merger (subject to the entire
fairness standard) and the two-step merger (subject to the business
judgment rule in light of the greater freedom of minority shareholders to
accept the front-end offer). The court was not, however, oblivious to the
risk that a two-step merger might sometimes confront minority investors
93. 808 A.2d 421 (Del. Ch. 2002).
[Vol. 50:4
FREEZE-OUTS
with a prisoner's dilemma, forcing them to accept less-than-optimal
consideration for their shares. Coercion of the minority would be more
subtle in a two-step merger than in a one-step merger, but still present.
94
Therefore, to level the playing field, Pure established three conditions
that must be met in order to exclude the transaction from entire fairness
review: (1) the offer must be subject to a nonwaivable condition of ap-
proval (expressed through tendering) by the majority of the minority;
(2) the bidder must guarantee to promptly consummate a short-form
merger at the same conditions of the tender offer in terms of price
and/or exchange ratio; and (3) the bidder can make no retributive threats
in dealing with the target's directors.
95
G. An Unnecessary Quandary
To sum up the discussion thus far, Delaware law provides two prima-
ry modes by which controlling shareholders can freeze-out minorities.
The first is the one-step, long-term, cash-out merger, subject to the en-
tire fairness standard of review. Absent certain procedures to protect
minority shareholders, the burden to prove fairness is on the defendants.
The burden is shifted to the plaintiffs, however, if a truly independent
special committee of the controlled corporation is instituted to negotiate
the deal, or if a majority of the minority unaffiliated shareholders of the
acquired corporation approve the merger. Alternatively, controlling
shareholders can employ a two-step tender offer followed by a short-
form merger, where entire fairness review applies only if the three Pure
conditions are not satisfied. Table 1 synthesizes the existing doctrinal
framework.
94. In addition, in a brilliant part of his remarkable opinion, Vice Chancellor Strine underlines
the parallel existing between directors' powers (and duties) in the context of a hostile takeover-
or, generally, an offer launched by a noncontrolling entity-and those in the context of a tender
offer in which the bidder is a controlling shareholder. If in the former situation directors should
have enough latitude-but also specific duties-to defend shareholders' interests from offers they
believe to be inadequate, it would be contradictory to hold that a tender offer launched by the
controlling shareholder would fall in a no-man's land in which directors of the target corporation
have no fiduciary duties. In re Pure Res., Inc., S'holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 439-41 (Del. Ch.
2002).
95. Id. at 445.
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TABLE 1: STANDARDS OF REVIEW FOR FREEZE-OUTS UNDER
DELAWARE LAW
If merger approved by (a)
special committee, or by (b) a
majority of minority share-
holders, the burden of prov-
Cash-out, long-form Entire fairness ing unfairness is on the plain-
merger - 10 review tiff
In all other cases, the burden
of proving entire fairness is
on the defendant
If:
Tender offer fol- (a) tender offer conditioned No entire
lowed by cash-out, p, on minority's approval; -* fairness
short-form merger (b) merger promptly after review
offer at same conditions;
(c) no retributive threats
As mentioned above, this doctrinal outcome has been widely criti-
cized by legal scholars and commentators. As concisely noted in one of
the most comprehensive recent studies on the subject,96 the different po-
sitions expressed can be divided into three major groups: (1) authors
who object to what they consider to be different standards of review for
transactions leading to the same result, and who therefore argue for
convergence toward either entire fairness review or the business judg-
ment rule ("convergence up" or "convergence down," to use Subrama-
nian's expression97) in both situations;98 (2) authors who approve the
current status of Delaware case law;99 and (3) authors who suggest
"mixed" approaches.'00 In a nutshell, critics of the status quo emphasize
that both transactions reach the same result (cashing out minorities), and
96. See Subramanian, supra note 4, at 22-30.
97. Id. at 23.
98. "Convergence up" toward some form of entire fairness review for a two-step freeze-out
has been advocated by Cannon, supra note 4; Levy, supra note 4; and Resnick, supra note 4.
99. See Jon E. Abramczyk et al., Going-Private "Dilemma "?-Not in Delaware, 58 Bus.
LAW. 1351 (2003); Pritchard, supra note 4; Thomas M. McElroy, 1I, Note, In re Pure Resources:
Providing Certainty to Attorneys Structuring Going-Private Transactions, or Not?, 39 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 539 (2004). Although Siegel also considers the holding in Pure correct, he criti-
cizes the court's reasoning. Siegel, supra note 4.
100. See Aronstam et al., supra note 4; Gilson & Gordon, supra note 4.
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that applying different standards of review results in unfair treatment of
shareholders. The majority of the writers seem to agree, more specifical-
ly, that shareholders are under-protected in the case of a two-step mer-
ger and advocate for additional procedural protections in such transac-
tions.10'
It is beyond the scope of this Article to engage in a detailed discus-
sion of the different positions expressed. Rather, this Section will ex-
plain why the general legal framework drawn by Delaware's judiciary is
sensible (if perhaps imperfect and subject to possible fine-tuning), and
why a substantial departure from the current approach is unnecessary.
The final Section of this Article illustrates how comparative analysis
supports the rationales behind current Delaware case law and suggests
some partial, but important, adjustments to the existing doctrine.
First, there are empirical studies on two-step mergers that seem to in-
dicate that minority shareholders are not under-protected in the event of
a freeze-out, and that they do not receive lower payments than in the
case of a one-step merger. For example, a recent analysis stated:
[O]ur evidence suggests that wealth effects and negotiation asso-
ciated with freeze-out bids are statistically equivalent in pre- and
post-Siliconix sub-periods. This evidence contrasts with the con-
ventional wisdom that tender offers present an optimal transac-
tion for controlling shareholders seeking to consummate a freeze-
out following the Siliconix decision. We infer instead that freeze-
out tender offers (like tender offers generally) provide a relative-
ly poor method for extracting deal value from atomistic target
shareholders, as they require the distribution of premium to all
minority shareholders sufficient to meet the reservation price of
the marginal informed shareholder. Given these results, we ques-
tion the economic basis underlying recent calls for a strengthen-
ing of the current review standards applied to freeze-out transac-
101. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 4, at 821 (observing that "there is a sharp disconnect
between Siliconix's characterization of the target board's role in responding to a freeze-out tender
offer by a controlling shareholder and the Delaware Supreme Court's characterization of the tar-
get board's role in responding to a third-party tender offer"); see also Stevelman, supra note 4, at
806. Even if our focus is on Delaware, it should also be observed that other states have developed
different doctrines or statutory approaches to these transactions. A very interesting case is offered
by Sections 1101 and 1101.1 of the California Corporation Code, which prevent a cash-out mer-
ger when the controlling shareholder owns less than 90% of the outstanding shares. In all other
situations, a cash merger is allowed only if a regulatory authority approves the fairness of the
transaction. See GEVURTZ, supra note 22, at 732.
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tions by the Delaware judiciary.' 02
Second, there is an even more compelling argument that calls into
question the thesis, based on a comparison between prices paid in one-
step and two-step freeze-outs, according to which tender offers followed
by short-form mergers should be subject to stricter scrutiny. The argu-
ment runs like this: Even if one can prove that in the long-form merger
scenario shareholders receive systematically higher premiums over the
market price of the shares than in a tender offer context, this does not
automatically imply that shareholders are unfairly undercompensated in
the second situation. It might as well be inferred that shareholders are
overcompensated in the case of a long-form merger. The special com-
mittee of independent directors, in other words, might "over shoot," po-
tentially motivated by concerns of lawsuits and possibly seeking to gain
a reputation as champions of investors. The simple fact that premiums
over market prices are larger in one case than in the other does not imp-
ly that the regulation of either one is intrinsically superior, unless it is
possible to compare the actual prices paid with some reliable indication
of the fair value of the shares. If, on the other hand, we assume that
markets are efficient and that market prices correctly reflect publicly
available information, including a discount for the possibility of being
cashed out, a higher premium on market prices might even be consi-
dered more, rather than less, problematic.
Third, from a doctrinal point of view, it is worth pointing out that
one-step and two-step freeze-out transactions are different, notwith-
standing the observation that they tend to accomplish similar results.
Similar results, however, are not, of themselves, sufficient to advocate a
need for absolutely identical rules. In fact, it is often the case in transac-
tional law that one specific factual outcome can be reached through dif-
ferent roads. While it is true that, in a two-step freeze-out, minority
shareholders tend to receive a lower price than in a one-step freeze-
out,103 and that this difference is caused by the veto power of the special
negotiating committee in the one-step merger and by the existence of
collective action problems and information asymmetries in the two-step
context, none of these considerations are sufficient to prove that the two
techniques should be subject to the same judicial standard.
In a two-step freeze-out, minorities are confronted with a tender offer
that they can accept or refuse. The offeror and the offeree are on oppo-
site sides of the transaction, and they do not suffer the same conflict of
102. Bates et al., supra note 8, at 29-30. But see Subramanian, supra note 28.
103. Subramanian, supra note 4, at 25.
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interest as managers of merged corporations in a one-step freeze-out.
Admittedly, minority shareholders are exposed to certain pressure to
tender, and one might debate whether Pure goes far enough to mitigate
that pressure, but the conceptual framework used by the Delaware
Chancery Court remains sound. Equal protection of investors means
treating all similarly-situated investors in a given deal equally; it does
not mean that investors should receive the same treatment regardless of
the type of transaction. That is, the law does not require the same kind
of protection in all situations.
The argument that the Pure rule creates an inconsistent dichotomy
between the duties of directors in a hostile takeover and those of direc-
tors in the context of a friendly tender offer deserves particular consid-
eration. Briefly, the argument proceeds that in the hostile acquisition
context, directors and managers have specific fiduciary duties to fend
off some value-maximizing offers which, while welcomed by minority
shareholders, are nonetheless undesirable for corporate insiders and
controlling shareholders because they waste corporate resources. It is
argued that these duties are at odds with the fact that no corollary duty
exists to require directors to protect the interests of minority sharehold-
ers when a controlling shareholder launches a two-step freeze-out. 10 4 By
way of contrast, proponents of this argument point out that in the tradi-
tional hostile acquisition context, the market itself affords an additional
line of protection to minority shareholders because if the consideration
tendered for their shares is too low, additional bidders can "auction" for
the shares, thereby maximizing the potential value of minority share-
holders' shares.
10 5
Once again, however, the differences between these two situations
justify different treatments. In the hostile takeover context, fiduciary du-
ties are imposed to curb the incentives of directors to adopt defenses in
conflict of interest, or-according to the Revlon rule-to ensure that
once a change in control is inevitable, and an auction among different
suitors is occurring, directors put shareholders' interests ahead of their
personal interests. 10 6 But to require specific procedural steps whereby
directors would negotiate the best possible price for minority sharehold-
ers in the front-end tender offer of a two-step minority freeze-out would
104. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 4, at 820; Stevelman, supra note 4, at 806.
105. Stevelman, supra note 4, at 806.
106. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del.
1986). For a discussion of the Revlon doctrine, see Clark W. Furlow, Reflections on the Revlon
Doctrine, t 1 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 519 (2009); Guhan Subramanian, The Drivers of Market Efficiency
in Revlon Transactions, 28 J. CORP. L. 691 (2003).
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be to impose on directors an active duty to intervene in a transaction be-
tween independent parties and to employ corporate assets to favor one
party over the other. The contextual difference is substantial, and com-
parisons to the friendly acquisition context where directors generally
help the weaker party obtain greater gains are insufficient to impose
such a duty.
Also, the argument concerning the protection offered to minority
shareholders by the potential for competitive bidding in the hostile ac-
quisition context is inconclusive. First of all, it is not the duty of the
courts to recreate, in every acquisition process, the same conditions
found in a contested takeover. But even assuming that shareholders are
entitled to benefit from competition among different buyers, the control-
ling shareholder initiating a minority freeze-out is generally in her posi-
tion of control precisely because at a prior point in the history of the
corporation, she acquired control through a contested takeover, wherein
all market protections were available to minority shareholders. Thus, it
can be said of any remaining minority shareholders that either: (1) at the
time the controlling shareholder wrested control, they decided not to sell
their shares; or (2) they bought their shares subsequent to the controlling
shareholder's power play and were aware that she could, potentially,
freeze them out at a later date. In the latter case, it is reasonable to as-
sume that the market discounted the shares' price for this possibility. In
either case, to artificially recreate the conditions of an auction for the
shares would be to overprotect the investors.' 
07
Finally, applying the entire fairness review to the two-step freeze-out
is incompatible with the very structure of the short-form merger, a ve-
hicle designed by the Delaware legislature to simplify the process of
going private. The argument has been emphasized by the Delaware ju-
diciary on more than one occasion:
[Section] 253 authorizes a summary procedure that is inconsis-
tent with any reasonable notion of fair dealing. In a short-form
merger, there is no agreement of merger negotiated by two com-
panies; there is only a unilateral act-a decision by the parent
company that its 90% owned subsidiary shall no longer exist as a
separate entity. The minority stockholders receive no advance
notice of the merger; their directors do not consider or approve it;




and there is no vote.10 8
If the back-end of the two-step freeze-out were subject to entire fair-
ness review, the corporation would find itself in a Catch-22 situation. It
must either bear the burden of proving fairness or shift the burden of
proof to the plaintiff by establishing procedural protections similar to
those required by Pure and its progeny. But, if he is forced to do this,
the controlling shareholder loses the advantage of the short-form merger
and might instead just opt for the long-form cash-out merger. In other
words, to require entire fairness review for the two-step freeze-out
would mean the end of the short-form merger.
Part V of this Article lays the foundation for a comparative analysis,
the implication of which supports the overall rationale followed by the
Delaware judiciary, and suggests some fme-tuning that would improve
the protection of minority shareholders in the context of a two-step
freeze-out.
III. FREEZE-OUT TRANSACTIONS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
A. Unavailability of Cash-Out Mergers in Europe
Cash-out mergers are generally not permitted in Europe. 109 Articles 3
and 4 of the Third Council Directive Concerning Mergers of Public Li-
mited Liability Companies (Third Directive)10 provide that in a "mer-
ger by acquisition" and in a "merger by the formation of a new compa-
ny," shareholders of the constituent corporations must receive shares of
the surviving corporation according to an exchange ratio agreed upon by
the boards of directors and approved by the shareholders. They can also
receive a cash payment, but "not exceeding 10% of the nominal value of
the shares ... issued or, where they have no nominal value, of their ac-
counting par value." '
Thus, shareholders of the corporation extinguished by the merger are
entitled to receive at least some shares of the surviving company and
108. Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 247 (Del. 2001).
109. A caveat is that, in some European jurisdictions, specific freeze-out rules that seem to
mimic the effect of a cash-out merger are available. However, not only are these provisions li-
mited to some countries and are not a common, harmonized trait of the European corporate law
scenario, but they are also significantly different, and more cumbersome and uncertain for the
controlling shareholder, than the American cash-out merger. For examples from Germany and the
United Kingdom, see infra Part III.G.
110. Third Council Directive 78/855/EEC, 1978 O.J. (L 295) 36.
111. Id. art. 4(1).
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cannot simply be cashed out. In other words, under European law, a
merger with an entirely cash consideration for some shareholders is un-
acceptable. This rule is the expression of a more general principle, still
reflected in the national laws of most Member States, that a sharehold-
er's participation right cannot be taken without her consent.'
12
To be sure, the exchange ratio could theoretically be set so high that
minority shareholders of the acquired corporation will not, as a matter
of fact, obtain shares of the acquiring corporation, similar to what can
happen in a reverse stock split, or share consolidation. Consider, for in-
stance, a situation where the controlling shareholder owns 51,000
shares, and no other shareholder matches this equity interest. If the ex-
change ratio is set at one share of the surviving corporation for every
51,000 shares of the merged corporation, only the majority shareholder
is able to obtain equity of the surviving entity.
The exchange ratio cannot be set arbitrarily but must express a fair
relationship between the value of the two constituent corporations and
their shares. According to the Third Directive, in all Member States, be-
fore the draft terms of a merger are presented to the shareholders, a ju-
dicially-appointed independent expert must examine the exchange ratio
and issue an opinion on its intrinsic fairness. 1 3 This provision embodies
in many respects one of the fundamental differences between European,
and in particular civil law based systems, and U.S. law. The former rely
more on ex ante procedural protections regulated by the legislature; the
latter is a litigation-based system where directors enjoy greater freedom
in structuring the deal but are subject to potentially extensive review
through ex post lawsuits. 1 4 Interestingly, in the United States, the out-
come of litigation often backfires on the process, suggesting procedural
112. For example, this principle is stated very clearly by a leading French scholar: "the share-
holder is a member of the corporation; this quality cannot be taken away from him because that
would constitute a true expropriation. Only with his consent can this right be disposed of."
("L'actionnaire est member de la socigtM; il ne peut pas Etre privd de cette qualitd parce qu'il y
aurait IA une vdritable expropriation. C'est seulment avec son consentment que son droit peut dis-
paraitre.") (author's translation). MICHEL GERMAIN, TRAITE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL 376
(Georges Ripert & Rend Roblot eds., 18th ed. 2002).
113. Third Council Directive, supra note 110, art. 10. The expert's opinion can be considered
binding because, in the absence of a positive assessment of the fairness of the transaction, minori-
ty shareholders can challenge the resolution approving the merger in court and have it set aside.
In addition, completing a merger that the court's expert has not declared fair can determine direc-
tors' liability toward minority shareholders, notwithstanding the approval of the controlling
shareholder.
114. See, e.g., Gerard Hertig & Hideki Kanda, Related Party Transactions, in THE ANATOMY
OF CORPORATE LAW 101, 117 (Reiner Kraakman et al. eds., 2004).
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protections for minorities that can avoid or reduce the risk of a class ac-
tion.
According to European rules, a listed corporation will virtually never
be allowed to pursue a merger with an exchange ratio so high as to
freeze out minority shareholders. It is possible that some small investors
may have insufficient shares to obtain even a single share of the result-
ing corporation, and in this case, the constituent corporations offer to
buy the shares. The vast majority of minority shareholders, however, are
entitled to maintain their status in the new corporation. The limitation
on cash consideration ensures this result.
Consider, for example a merger in which the par value of the shares
of both corporations is El, the real value for one share of P (the par-
ent/acquiring corporation) is E2, and the real value of one share of S (the
subsidiary/target) is El.10. The exchange ratio would be 0.55 (1.10/2),
meaning that for each share of S, an investor is entitled to 0.55 shares of
P. This will result in many shareholders of S being entitled only to a
fraction of P's shares, with obvious complications for the merger
process. European law allows reducing the exchange ratio by offering
consideration partially in cash. The cash consideration cannot, however,
exceed 10% of the par value of P's shares. In this example, it would be
possible to provide that for each S share, an investor is entitled to EQ. 10
cash (10% of the E l par vale) on top of the exchange ratio, consequently
setting the exchange ratio at 0.5 (2/1), a more manageable figure.
115
These adjustments, however, are very limited and, as a practical mat-
ter, are simply used to round up the exchange ratio, not to cash out mi-
norities. In this respect, the European approach resembles the one preva-
lent in the United States before the mid-1930s, when corporate statutes
were just beginning to allow cash-out mergers. 
1 6
B. Shareholders' Remedies in Case ofDelisting Through Merger:
Challenging the Transaction
The fact that cash-out mergers are not generally possible in Europe
does not preclude the use of mergers in a public-to-private transaction in
which a listed corporation is merged into a nonlisted one. Minority
shareholders will participate in the resulting corporation (not an ideal
prospect from the point of view of the acquirer), but delisting still en-
115. For a discussion of par value, real value, and exchange ratios of certain merger
processes, see LUIGI A. BIANCHI, IL GIUDIZIO DI 'CONGRUITA' DEL RAPPORTO DI CAMBIO
NELLA FUSIONE (2002).
116. See supra Part ll.B.
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sures a lower regulatory burden and, in many cases, increased flexibility
for the controlling shareholders and directors.
With this background, it is revealing to discuss briefly two additional
differences between the European and American approaches: (1) proce-
dures governing short-form mergers in Europe, and (2) remedies for
dissenting shareholders.
European law provides for simplified procedures designed to facili-
tate merging a subsidiary with and into a parent corporation that owns a
substantive percentage of the subsidiary's shares. The two most impor-
tant provisions in this respect are Articles 24 and 27 of the Third Direc-
tive. The vehicle created by Article 27 bears notable resemblance to the
American short-form merger, but also differs in important respects. It is
applicable to mergers where the surviving corporation holds more than
90% (and less than 100%) of the voting shares and securities of the
merging corporation. In this situation, the business combination does
not require the approval of the shareholders of the acquiring corpora-
tion.
117
There are, however, at least four major differences distinguishing this
"European short-form merger" from its American counterpart. First, in
the European transaction, both the directors and the shareholders of the
target corporation have an inalienable right to vote on the merger. Con-
versely, DGCL Section 253 and MBCA Section 11.04 require only that
the American short-form merger be given the green light from the direc-
tors of the acquiring corporation.
Second, under European law, specific and extensive information
must be provided to the nonvoting shareholders of the parent corpora-
tion in advance of the shareholders' meeting of the acquired corpora-
tion. As in the case of a long-form merger, the merger agreement ap-
proved by the boards of directors, the financial statements of three
preceding years of both corporations, a current financial statement, and
the above-mentioned fairness opinion of the court-appointed appraiser
must be deposited with the corporation's secretary and made available
for inspection to all shareholders at least one month before the date of
the shareholders' meeting. 18 This inspection right gives shareholders
information allowing them to have a say in the consummation of the
merger.
Third, in Europe, a qualified minority of the acquiring corporation's
shareholders, representing not more than 5% (though Member States




can require a lower threshold), can request that the merger be submitted
to the shareholders' meeting and thereby reinstate the regular approval
process.' 19
Fourth, European Law requires that, in both short-form mergers and
long-form mergers, substantive documentation, such the merger agree-
ment, financial statements, and expert's fairness opinion, be prepared
and made available to shareholders. It is possible to avoid these re-
quirements so long as minority shareholders of the controlled corpora-
tion are given the option to receive the fair value of their shares in cash
and are afforded, in case of disagreement over shares' valuation, a judi-
cial appraisal process. 120 This is not a forced cash-out of minorities
since it occurs at the election of minority shareholders, who can other-
wise obtain shares of the surviving corporation according to the ex-
change ratio.
An even more streamlined procedure is available when the acquiring
corporation is the sole shareholder of the target. Third Directive Article
24 provides that in such a case it is unnecessary to obtain approval at the
parent company's shareholders' meeting. In addition, determining an
exchange ratio is also unnecessary, since there are no minority share-
holders requiring receipt of consideration. Once again, however, direc-
tors must publish the relevant documents, and a qualified minority of
the surviving corporation's shareholders may require the holding of a
general meeting. 
2 1
In sum, when a subsidiary is merged into a parent corporation hold-
ing 90% or more of the voting securities, the same rationale that inspires
short-form mergers in the United States commands a simplified merger
process under European law. In Europe, however, shareholders retain
stronger information rights, enjoy the benefit of a pre-merger fairness
opinion by an independent judge-appointed financial expert, and can
even bring the entire procedure to a halt by requiring a shareholders'
vote.
The analysis becomes more complicated, however, when evaluating
dissenters' rights. In fact, this issue is not comprehensively regulated or
harmonized in the European context. Instead, the Third Directive sets
forth minimal standards, and each jurisdiction mandates different rules.
Rather than undertake a detailed discussion of the technical differences
119. Id. arts. 8(c), 27(c).
120. Id. art. 28.
121. Id. art. 24.
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among different states, this Article considers the overall framework and
highlights a few country-specific examples.
First, the Third Directive requires Member States to regulate the civil
liability of directors, managers, and independent experts for misconduct
in the merger process.122 Shareholders can sue for breach of fiduciary
duties and seek monetary damages if the exchange ratio is unfairly pre-
judicial. In addition, at least in theory, acquisition of a subsidiary by a
parent might be considered a less-than-arm's-length transaction, making
it subject to rules governing conflicted transactions. 23 Comparative re-
search has convincingly demonstrated that a fundamental difference be-
tween European and U.S. corporate law systems is the degree of re-
liance on shareholder-driven litigation as a tool for enforcement of the
fiduciary duties of directors and controlling shareholders.124 The re-
liance is limited in the European context and extensive in the American
context. 125 Complex and multifaceted factors explain this divergence.
Procedural obstacles to derivative suits and class actions in Europe play
a major role, as does the prevalence of concentrated ownership struc-
tures (making the development of extensive ex post litigation led by mi-
nority shareholders less likely).
126
It should be noted that neither of these divergent underlying philoso-
phies-U.S. reliance on ex post civil litigation and European reliance on
ex ante statutory procedural protections and shareholder voting-is in-
herently superior to the other. For the purpose of comparing going-
122. Id. art. 20.
123. For an overview of the different approaches to directors' conflicts of interest and duty of
loyalty, see Luca Enriques, The Law on Company Directors' Self-Dealing: A Comparative Analy-
sis, 2 INT'L & COMP. CORP. L.J. 297 (2000). For information on the regulation of conflicts of in-
terest with respect to controlling shareholders in some European countries, see Pierre-Henri Con-
ac et al., Constraining Dominant Shareholders' Self-Dealing: The Legal Framework in France,
Germany and Italy, 4 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 491 (2007).
124. In this respect, it has been observed:
U.S. jurisdictions have a more developed duty of loyalty than other jurisdictions. One
reason is that U.S. courts are more willing to review managerial transactions .... A
second reason is that U.S. law encourages shareholder lawsuits. Not only are the proce-
dural thresholds for shareholder suits relatively low in the U.S., but a combination of
discovery mechanisms and generous attorney's fees is also available to support a specia-
lized plaintiffs bar.
Hertig & Kanda, supra note 114, at 116 (citations omitted).
125. See id.
126. For a comparative analysis of shareholders' derivative suits in the United States, Eng-
land, Germany, France, and Italy showing how continental European systems do not have the
preconditions for the widespread use of these types of actions which exist in common law coun-
tries, see ALESSANDRO DE NICOLA, SHAREHOLDER SUITS: THE ROLES AND MOTIVATIONS OF
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS AND DIRECTORS IN DERIVATIVE SUITS (2006).
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private transactions across the Atlantic, it is sufficient to point out how
lawsuits based on a breach of fiduciary duty of controlling shareholders
or directors are not nearly as common or relevant to protecting minori-
ties in Europe as in the United States.
In addition to, or in connection with, seeking damages for breach of a
fiduciary duty, a European merger may be challenged for lack of author-
ity or other illegalities by dissenting minorities seeking rescission.
127
The same reluctance showed by American judges in granting rescission
of a completed merger 128 is reflected in the Third Directive and in Euro-
pean corporate statutes and codes. In most jurisdictions, a merger cannot
be declared "void" after the publication of the merger deed or for a short
period thereafter. From the moment of publication on, only monetary
damages can be granted. 129 The same reasons that discourage share-
holders' litigation for breach of the duty of care or of loyalty in the
American context tend to deter recourse to these types of causes of ac-
tion in the European context.
C. Appraisal Rights in the Merger Context
Shareholders of a listed corporation dissenting from a merger in
which the surviving corporation is unlisted might enjoy dissenters'
rights similar to U.S. appraisal rights. Once again, however, European
law is not harmonized on the subject, and Member States' rules reflect
significant differences. Nevertheless, interesting common traits can be
extrapolated from specific examples.
Consider, for instance, appraisal rights under Italian law, where a re-
cent reform profoundly innovated the former approach and introduced a
fairly modem set of rules. 30 In the Italian system, mergers are not al-
ways a ground for invoking appraisal rights. Rather, right to appraisal is
conditioned on majority shareholder approval of specific amendments to
the corporate charter and other relevant corporate events, among which
mergers are not included. A merger can, indirectly, represent a ground
127. For a brief description of Spanish law in this respect, see Agustin Madrid Parra, Trans-
formaci6n, fusirn, y escisi6n de las sociedades mercantiles, in DERECHO MERCANTIL 669 (2003).
128. See Ala. Fid. Mortgage & Bond Co. v. Dubberly, 73 So. 911, 915 (Ala. 1916) ("It would
be a painful travesty upon justice if a court of equity, in order to conserve the fights of a few
stockholders in one of the parent companies, should destroy the property rights of innocent stock-
holders in the new company."); COX & HAZEN, supra note 22, at 618.
129. See, e.g., Codice civile [C.c.] art. 2504-quater (Italy).
130. Marco Ventoruzzo, Cross-Border Mergers, Change of Applicable Corporate Laws and
Protection of Dissenting Shareholders: Withdrawal Rights Under Italian Law, 4 EUR. COMPANY
& FIN. L. REV. 47 (2007).
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for the appraisal remedy, but only when it triggers one of the fundamen-
tal changes specifically listed in the Italian Civil Code.131 The list in-
cludes, among others: a conversion of a joint stock corporation in a dif-
ferent business association, the adoption of a different corporate purpose
(in several European systems, corporate purposes should be defined
more narrowly than in the United States), the transfer of the legal seat
abroad (because it might lead to the application of the corporate laws of
a different state), and modification of shareholders' voting and econom-
ic rights. 132 A merger can indirectly cause one of these changes and
therefore allow dissenting shareholders to liquidate their investment.
But a merger in itself does not trigger an appraisal remedy. In addition,
when considering transactions resulting in the delisting of a listed cor-
poration, Italian law also provides appraisal rights for shareholders who
do not approve going private. 133 While there is some ambiguity con-
cerning the precise scope of this provision, it can be argued that merg-
ing a listed corporation into a closely held one is a ground for appraisal.
Spanish law also restricts corporate charter amendments that trigger
appraisal rights-or withdrawal rights, as they are occasionally referred
to in Europe-and the list does not include mergers as a general rule.
134
131. C.C. art. 2437 (Italy); see also Ventoruzzo, supra note 130, at 62.
132. Ventoruzzo, supra note 130, at 62.
133. C.C. art. 2437 (Italy); see also Ventoruzzo, supra note 130, at 62.
134. According to Spanish corporate law, shareholders have, in limited circumstances, an ap-
praisal--or "withdrawal"--right called a derecho de separaci6n. As a leading treatise puts it, pur-
suant to the Ley de sociedades an6nimas (LSA), shareholders' rights include the appraisal right in
the event of: a change in the corporate purpose; the conversion of a corporation into a general or
limited partnership; the transfer of the corporate seat to a foreign jurisdiction; the transfer of the
corporate seat of a Societas Europaea (SE) to another EU member State; a merger that implies
the creation of an SE in another member State and in the event of the establishment of a holding
SE ("derecho de separaci6n en los supuestos de sustituci6n del objeto-art. 147-, de
transformaci6n de sociedad an6nima en sociedad colectiva o comanditaria-art. 225-, de
transferencia del domicilio social al extranjero-art. 149.2-, de traslado del domicilio de una SE
a otro Estado miembro della UE-art. 315-, de fusi6n que implica la constituci6n de una SE en
otro Estado miembro-art. 320-, y de constituci6n de una SE holding.") (author's approximate
translation). Also important for our purposes is the shareholders' right to maintain their participa-
tion in case of a merger pursuant to Articles 229 and 247 of the LSA. See Ignacio Lojendio
Osborne, La Acci6n. Los Derechos del Socio, in DERECHO MERCANTIL 275, 300 (2006). In addi-
tion, as kindly pointed out to me by Miguel Trias Sagnier, a new case of appraisal rights in the
sociedad anfnima has been recently introduced by the Ley 3/2009, de 3 de abril de Modifica-
ciones Estructurales de las Sociedades Mercantiles (B.O.E. 2009, 5614), available at
http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2009/04/
04/pdfs/BOE-A-2009-5614.pdf. Email from Miguel Trias Sagnier, Professor, ESADE Business
School, to author (Nov. 6, 2009) (on file with author). According to Article 15 of this statute, in
case of the conversion of a sociedad andnima into a sociedad de responsabilidad limitada, share-
holders that have not approved the conversion also have a right to withdraw. Before this amend-
ment, under Spanish corporate law, only the conversion of a sociedad de responsabilidad limita-
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Mergers and spinoffs are also not an independent ground to trigger ap-
praisal rights in France and Germany.' 35 A first observation, therefore,
is that while appraisal rights are available in Europe in the merger con-
text, the ground for exercising these rights is considerably more narrow
than that afforded in the United States.
A second observation concerns valuation rules for dissenters' shares.
In some systems, different rules are provided for listed and nonlisted
corporations. For the latter, many states provide criteria inspired by the
same rationale as that behind the Delaware Block Method, but with
more flexibility. 136 More important for the purpose of this Article is that
European states frequently fail to provide general market exemptions
(i.e., rules limiting appraisal rights to unlisted securities) for listed cor-
porations. For appraisal purposes, the valuation of shares listed on an
exchange is usually based on the average price of the shares over a set
period preceding the event triggering the right to appraisal.
Once again, the Italian regulation offers an illustration. According to
Article 2437-quarter of the Italian Civil Code, while nonlisted shares
are valued by applying a statutory formula resembling the Delaware
Block Method, valuation of listed shares is defined by the Civil Code as
the arithmetic (i.e., not weighted) average of the closing prices of every
negotiation day in the six months preceding the publication of the
shareholder meeting's call. 
137
Corporate statutes of other European jurisdictions provide similar
formulas. For example, in Spain, the appraisal value of listed shares for
shareholders dissenting from a change of the corporate purpose is estab-
da into a sociedad an6nima would trigger an appraisal right.
135. Shortly before the enactment of the Takeover Directive, a comparative analysis under-
lined how, with respect to appraisal rights, unlike the United States, "neither Germany nor France
had any comparable ex ante exit protection in the case of a merger or takeover." See Katharina
Pistor et al., The Evolution of Corporate Law: A Cross-Country Comparison, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 791, 831 (2002).
136. For example, according to Article 2437-ter of the Italian Civil Code, the evaluation of
the nonlisted shares of a dissenting shareholder requires that three elements be taken into account:
the value of the assets of the corporation, the net present value of future earnings, and the market
price, if available. See Ventoruzzo, supra note 130, at 65.
137. See id. at 66; see also Marco Ventoruzzo, I criteri di valutazione delle azioni in caso di
recesso del socio, 50 RISTA DELLE SOCIETA 309, 393 (2005). A delicate interpretive problem is
how to proceed when there are no data on the market prices for six months, for instance, because
the negotiation of the shares has been suspended for a few weeks or months by the Italian Stock
Exchange. In similar cases it should be possible, when necessary, to integrate the legal criteria
provided for listed shares with the above-mentioned rules applicable to the evaluation of nonlisted
shares.
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lished, according to Article 147.2 of the Ley de Sociedades An6nimas,
by the average market price of the last three months.'
38
This criterion often fails to capture the fair current value of shares,
especially when, as is often the case in freeze-out transactions, prices
are depressed and when this price depression is the precise factor moti-
vating the controlling shareholder to go private. In addition, as Professor
Gevurtz warns, reliance on market prices---especially on a long histori-
cal series of prices-is particularly problematic in a freeze-out, for the
very reason that "the market price should reflect the risk that the majori-
ty will freeze out the minority.' ' 139 Bebchuk and Kahan also identify this
concern, arguing that the very possibility of minority cash-out mergers
may push down market prices.'
40
Summing up, cash-out mergers are not generally available for con-
ducting a going-private transaction in Europe. Minority shareholders are
protected through specific ex ante devices, the most important being the
binding fairness opinion on the exchange rate issued by a court-
appointed expert. In line with this limitation, dissenters' rights play a
more limited role in protecting minority shareholders, both in terms of
their scope of application and the determination of the fair value of
shares.
D. Statutory Freeze-Out in Europe: Takeover Directive, Article 15
The fact that cash-out mergers are not the principal method by which
to conduct going-private transactions in Europe does not mean that
freeze-outs are impossible. A freeze-out can, in fact, be accomplished
through a different legal technique, explicitly regulated by Article 15 of
the Thirteenth Directive on Takeovers (Takeover Directive).'
41
In short, Article 15, under certain conditions, grants any shareholder
acquiring at least 90% of the voting shares of a listed corporation
through a tender offer the right to cash out minorities at a fair price. In
these general terms, the overall structure of the provision recalls a U.S.-
138. Juan Manuel Gomez Porrua, La Modificaci6n de los Estatutos Sociales. Aumento y
Reducci6n del Capital Social, in DERECHO MERCANTIL 378,401 (2006). In other European juris-
dictions, however, some consideration is also given to other elements in determining the fair val-
ue of the shares. In Germany, for example, the appraisal valuation is based on a two-prong test
that takes into account both market prices and a cash-flow analysis (the so-called Ertragswertver-
fahren), based on standards set by the German Institute of Auditors (Institut der Wirt-
shafisprnifer). Email from Peter 0. M0lbert, supra note 10.
139. GEVURTZ, supra note 22, at 736.
140. Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 21.
141. Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on Takeover Bids,
art. 15, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12, 21.
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style short-form merger. Upon closer analysis, however, important and
profound differences emerge. First, pursuant to Article 15, minorities
are cashed out without merging the target into the parent corporation.
After the majority shareholder exercises the freeze-out right, the delisted
target can either maintain its corporate identity as a wholly-owned sub-
sidiary or can be completely merged into the parent.
To understand this rule and appreciate its nuances, a word on the
general EU framework for takeover regulation is necessary. European
law, largely inspired by the U.K. experience, provides for a mechanism
foreign to U.S. corporate law: the mandatory bid. Set forth in Article 5
of the Takeover Directive, the mandatory bid provides that anyone who
acquires control of a listed corporation must launch a tender offer on all
the outstanding voting shares, including shares with limited voting
rights. The price of the offer cannot be lower than the highest price paid
by the bidder for the securities in a pre-determined period (between six
to twelve months preceding the triggering event of the acquisition of
control, according to the individual Member State). 142 During the offer,
an all-holders/best-price rule similar to the one set forth in SEC Rule
14d- 10 applies. 
143
The rationale for the mandatory bid is twofold: It distributes the con-
trol premium to all shareholders and grants a fair way out for minority
investors. While the rule can be advantageous for minority shareholders
in case of a friendly acquisition (i.e., an acquisition in which the con-
trolling shareholder sells in order to reap the capital gains of her invest-
ment), serious doubts are cast on its overall effect on the corporate con-
trol market. A mandatory bid might render acquisitions-especially
hostile ones-particularly expensive, thereby hindering an efficient cor-
porate control market. 144
142. Id. arts. 5(4), 17.
143. Both European and U.S. rules provide that all shareholders should be offered the same
consideration for their shares, and that if higher consideration is offered to any shareholder prior
to the close of the offer window, that same consideration must be extended to all shareholders.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-t0(a)(2); Directive 2004/25/EC, supra note 141, arts. 5(4), 7. For a his-
tory and analysis of Securities Exchange Act Rule 14d-10, see Rusty A. Fleming, A Case of
"'When" Rather than "Wat:" Tender Offers Under the Williams Act and the All Holders and
Best Price Rules, 27 S. ILL. U. L.J. 263 (2003).
144. Mandatory bids are triggered once the bidder acquires a specified percentage of corpo-
rate shares. If the ownership structure of a corporation is concentrated, such that the largest share-
holder owns a percentage of shares higher than the threshold triggering the mandatory bid provi-
sion, then bidders seeking to acquire corporate control must have the purchasing power to buy all
outstanding shares. Marco Ventoruzzo, Takeover Regulation as a Wolf in Sheep 's Clothing: Tak-
ing U.K. Rules to Continental Europe, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 135, 140 (2008).
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Voluntary tender offers on a percentage up to the full amount of out-
standing shares are also possible under the Takeover Directive. In such
a case, the price is freely set by the bidder. An important exception to
the mandatory bid, however, is that an investor that acquires control
through a voluntary tender offer on all the outstanding shares is not re-
quired to follow up the voluntary offer with an additional mandatory
bid. 145 The rationale is that the offeror has already granted to all share-
holders the possibility to sell their shares, and the very success of the
bid-the fact that a controlling stake was obtained-indicates that the
price offered was adequate. On the other side of the coin, there are sit-
uations where technically a subject has not acquired control but a com-
pulsory offer is still mandated. For instance, if someone who already
owns de-facto control but less than an absolute majority of the voting
shares creeps up toward 50% plus one share at a quick pace (depending
on the jurisdiction, this might be a 30% acquisition within one year),
146
the acquisition triggers an obligation to launch a mandatory bid under
the assumption that a control premium is being paid.
With this background in mind, freeze-out rights set forth in Article 15
of the Takeover Directive can be understood. This provision requires
Member States to provide for freeze-out rights when, following a volun-
tary or mandatory tender offer on all the outstanding shares (an event
known as a "triggering tender offer"), certain conditions are met. Spe-
cifically, there are two scenarios that trigger the freeze-out right.
The first scenario occurs when the shares tendered in the triggering
offer raise the ownership of the offeror above 90% of the voting capital,
and the shares tendered represent at least 90% of the ones included in
the offer. 147 The second condition can be described as (super)majority of
minority approval; no different, notwithstanding its very high threshold,
from Delaware requirements articulated in Getty Oil14 8 and Pure.149 I
will call this first freeze-out right the "majority of the minority" freeze-
out.
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Takeover Directive, Member States can
also opt for the alternative scenario: freeze-out rights triggered when, as
a consequence of the tender offer, the bidder holds securities
representing not less than 90% of the capital carrying voting rights and
145. Directive 2004/25/EC, supra note 141, arts. 5(2), 17.
146. This is the case in Italy pursuant to Section 106 of the Testo Unico della Finanza. De-
cree-Law of Feb. 24, 1998, No. 58, Gazz. Uff., Mar. 26, 1998, no. 71, Suppl. Ord. no. 52 (Italy).
147. Directive 2004/25/EC, supra note 141, arts. 15(2)(a), 21.
148. Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929 (Del. 1985).
149. In re Pure Res., Inc., S'holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421 (Del. Ch. 2002).
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90% of the voting rights, 5 ' independent of the rate of acceptance of the
tender offer. In this instance, minorities are cashed out even if a majori-
ty of the shares of the nonaffiliated investors have not been tendered, as
long as subsequent to the offer, the bidder reached the 90% thre-
sholds. 151 This might occur when a shareholder holding a little less than
the triggering threshold, or already holding more than 90%, launches a
tender offer that receives few acceptances. I will call this the "single
threshold freeze-out."
As previously mentioned, Member States can choose to adopt either
the single threshold or the majority of the minority freeze-out proce-
dure. This optional regime represents another compromise among the
different positions of the Member States, together with other optional
provisions that characterize the Takeover Directive. 52 Historically, the
single threshold approach was adopted in several continental European
countries, while the majority of the minority approach was followed in
the United Kingdom. 153 In most situations, the single threshold ap-
proach facilitates the squeeze-out of minorities because no (super) ma-
jority of the minority requirement can be met. Coherently with this fea-
ture, according to Article 15(2) of the Takeover Directive, Member
States that choose to implement the single threshold freeze-out can pro-
vide for a threshold higher than 90% and lower than 95%.154
It should also be noted that if the target corporation has issued mul-
tiple classes of voting shares, Member States implementing the Takeo-
ver Directive can adopt a "disjoint freeze-out," allowing for the majority
shareholder to exercise his buy-out right by class, but only on the shares
of the class in which the relevant threshold is reached.
155
For example, consider a corporation that has issued ten million shares
of common stock and ten million shares of preferred stock carrying li-
mited voting rights only on fundamental charter amendments and busi-
150. Owning 90% of the voting capital does not necessarily mean that the bidder holds 90%
of the voting rights of the corporation. These percentages might not directly correlate to the extent
that voting rights are attached to nonequity securities or notes.
151. Directive 2004/25/EC, supra note 141, arts. 15(2)(b), 21.
152. For a critical analysis of the extensive scope of optional rules in the Takeover Directive,
see Vanessa Edwards, The Directive on Takeover Bids-Not Worth the Paper It's Written On?, 1
EuR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 416 (2004).
153. Silja Maul & Dani~le Muffat-Jeandet, The Directive on Takeover Bids, in TAKEOVER
BIDS IN EUROPE: THE TAKEOVER DIRECTIVE AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION IN THE MEMBER
STATES 1, 57-58 (Silja Maul et al. eds., 2008).
154. Directive 2004/25/EC, supra note 141, arts. 15(2)(b), 21.
155. Id. arts. 15(3), 21.
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ness combination-a practice relatively common in Europe. 56 Both
categories of shares are listed on a national stock exchange, and the con-
trolling shareholder holds 85% of the common stock and 65% of the
preferred shares. Given that the Member State whose laws are applica-
ble has introduced the "single threshold" freeze-out, the triggering thre-
shold is set at 95%. The controlling shareholder launches a voluntary
offer on all the outstanding common and preferred shares, with the in-
tention of going private. The offers on the common shares and on the
preferred shares are issued at different prices, reflecting the different
values of the securities. At the end of the offering period, the bidder
reaches 98% of the common shares, but only 89% of the preferred
shares. The majority shareholder owns 93.5% of the entire voting capi-
tal (9.8 million common stock shares, plus 8.9 million preferred stock
shares, with over twenty million outstanding shares), but still less than
90% of the preferred shares. If the Member State has not opted for the
"disjoint" freeze-out, the offeror will be able to cash out all the minority
shareholders independently from the type of shares they own. If, on the
other hand, the jurisdiction has opted into the rule set forth in Article
15(3) of the Takeover Directive, then the offeror could only cash out
common stockholders.
The effect of a squeeze-out by class is difficult to assess. On the one
hand, it increases the flexibility of the rule and facilitates the reshaping
of the equity structure of the corporation without requiring buying subs-
tantively all the shares of different classes. On the other hand, it might
make cash-outs aimed at eliminating all minority shareholders more fi-
nancially burdensome because it requires reaching the relevant thre-
shold for every single class of shares. Some countries, such as Italy and
the United Kingdom, have opted for this greater flexibility, while oth-
ers, such as France, do not allow freeze-outs limited to one class of
shares.
57
156. For a discussion and some empirical evidence on the widespread use of limited voting
shares in Europe, see ASSOC. OF BRITISH INSURERS, APPLICATION OF THE ONE-SHARE, ONE-
VOTE PRINCIPLE IN EUROPE (2005), available at http://www.abi.org.uk/Publications/
Application of the one share -one vote_principle inEurope _I.aspx.
157. Joelle Simon, France, in TAKEOVER BIDS IN EUROPE, supra note 153, at 217, 255; see
also Commission Staff Working Document: Report on the Implementation of the Directive on
Takeover Bids, at 9, SEC (2007) 268 (Feb. 21, 2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
internal market/company/docs/takeoverbids/2007-02-report en.pdf [hereinafter Takeover Direc-
tive Implementation Report] (documenting the adoption of the mandatory bid and freeze-out pro-
visions of the Takeover Directive among the member states); Peter Burbridge, United Kingdom,
in TAKEOVER BIDS IN EUROPE, supra note 153, at 571, 603; Lucia Picardi, Italy, in TAKEOVER
BIDS IN EUROPE, supra note 153, at 391, 415.
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E. Freeze-Out Consideration and Fair Price Presumptions
At what price should the freeze-out right be exercised? As a general,
and relatively empty, principle, the first part of Article 15(5) of the
Takeover Directive provides that "[f]ollowing a mandatory bid, the con-
sideration offered in the bid shall be presumed to be fair." 158 More spe-
cifically, two rules govern the determination of the fair price: one con-
cerns the type of consideration, and the other concerns the amount of
consideration offered.
Regarding the first rule, the Takeover Directive provides that the
consideration offered in minority squeeze-out situations shall have the
same form as consideration offered in a preceding triggering tender of-
fer. In other words, if the preceding offer is for cash, minority share-
holders must be squeezed out in cash. If the 90% threshold is reached
through a stock-for-stock offer, the consideration for the freeze-out can
be represented by the same type of securities, but cash is a viable alter-
native. If noncash or not-entirely-cash consideration is offered, Member
States can also require the bidder that wants to freeze-out minorities to
also offer an all-cash alternative. 
159
In terms of fair price, the Takeover Directive provides for two differ-
ent presumptions of fairness, depending on the type of tender offer that
led to the relevant threshold. In the case of a mandatory tender offer
triggered by acquisition of control, the minimum price is not freely de-
termined by the bidder. Takeover Directive Article 5(4) provides that
the offer shall be launched at a price not lower than the highest price
paid by the bidder in a period, set by the single Member States, between
six and twelve months preceding the acquisition of control. When
freeze-out rights are exercised after a mandatory tender offer, the price
of the front-end offer, floored by this general rule, is deemed fair for
cash-out purposes.
On the other hand, when the freeze-out threshold is reached through a
voluntary bid, there is no minimum statutory price required by the Di-
rective and, therefore, no guarantee on the fairness of the front-end of-
fering price. In this circumstance, according to the Takeover Directive,
the price of the voluntary offer is presumptively fair only if the shares
tendered are more than 90% of those comprised in the bid.'60 A majority
158. Directive 2004/25/EC, supra note 141, arts. 15(5), 21-22.
159. See id. art. 15(5) ("Member States shall ensure that a fair price is guaranteed. That price
shall take the same form as the consideration offered in the bid or shall be in cash. Member States
may provide that cash shall be offered at least as an alternative.").
160. It should be noted that shares acquired during the tender offer's acceptance period, but
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of the minority test is therefore applied to determine the fairness of the
triggering tender offer. It should be noted that this rule applies both to
the majority of the minority freeze-out and to the single threshold
freeze-out, whenever the freeze-out follows a voluntary tender offer. In
the case of a majority of the minority freeze-out, the presumption of
fairness for the tender offer's price is met by definition. This is not al-
ways the case, however, in a single threshold freeze-out.
161
There might be situations in which the offeror meets the requirements
for squeezing out minority shareholders but no presumption of fair price
applies. For example, in a country providing for the single threshold
freeze-out, the controlling shareholder holding 70% of the shares might
launch a voluntary bid and obtain a little bit more than two thirds of the
outstanding shares. This would grant her more than 90% of all shares,
and therefore the right to cash out minorities. Nevertheless, no fair price
presumption applies because her offer did not reach 90% of the shares
included in the offer. In these situations, Member States often set up
specific rules to determine fair price. Several Member States use some
form of appraisal by regulatory agency, independent expert, or court
proceeding.'
62
The Takeover Directive does not, however, further clarify whether
the fairness presumption regarding the price of the triggering tender of-
fer is rebuttable-an important issue for litigation purposes. Some au-
thors, in particular German commentators Krause, Austmann, and Men-
nicke, argue that the presumption is not rebuttable.'63 While it is
outside the mechanism of the tender offer (i.e., blocks of shares acquired directly from qualified
minority shareholders) do not count toward the 90% threshold under Article 15(5). See id.
161. In fact, even if the shareholder exercising the freeze-out owns no shares before launch-
ing the triggering tender offer, under the majority of the minority approach, she still has to ac-
quire at least 90% of the shares included in the offer in order to freeze out the minority. This
translates into at least 90% of all the outstanding shares. Obviously, if-as is normally the case-
the acquiring shareholder already owns a substantial percentage of the outstanding shares and
obtains more than 90% of the shares targeted in the tender offer, then she also obtains more than
90% of the total outstanding shares.
162. See Takeover Directive Implementation Report, supra note 157.
163. See A. Austmann & P. Mennicke, Obernahmerechlicher Squeeze-out und Sell-out, NEUE
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 846, 851 (2004); H. Krause, BB-Europareport: Die
EU-Obernahmerichtiline - Anpassungsbedarf im Wertpapiererwerbs- und Obernahmegesetz, 3
DER BETRIEBS-BERATER 113, 118 (2004). But see P. Mllbert, Umsetzungsfragen der
Obernahmerechlichtlinie - erheblicher Anderungsbedarf bei den heutigen Vorschiften des
WpCG, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 633, 634 (2004). Two recent cases in
Germany addressed this issue. See Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Trial Court Frankfurt] Dec. 9,
2008, WPIOG 2/08, NZG 2009, 74 (F.R.G.); Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Trial Court Stuttgart]
May 5, 2009, 20 W 13/08, WM 2009, 1416 (F.R.G.). Both decisions favor the theory that the pre-
sumption is not rebuttable, but they do not adopt a rigid and final interpretation.
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difficult to offer a general answer, one can observe that, even if the fair
price presumption is rebuttable, it is highly improbable that a price
deemed presumptively adequate by the legislature would be subject to
extensive judicial review in the light of specific factual circumstances,
especially in civil law countries.
One final observation on the fair price presumption that is set forth
by the Takeover Directive: Setting the freeze-out price at the same level
as that preceding a mandatory or voluntary tender offer-similar to that
which is required in Delaware under Pure-serves two conflicting
goals. The first is to protect minorities from the pressure to tender in a
front-loaded two-step acquisition. The second goal, however, is to avoid
strategic behavior by minority shareholders. But if minority sharehold-
ers are expecting a higher price to follow in the freeze-out, they will be
tempted to withhold their shares in the front-end offer even if the price
is fair. This strategy, rational at the individual level, might create a mar-
ket failure because of collective action and coordination problems. If
many shareholders follow this reasoning, the front-end tender offer may
not reach required thresholds, making it impossible to trigger freeze-out
rights. This outcome is damaging not only to the controlling sharehold-
er, but also possibly to the corporation and to minority shareholders.
In light of this dichotomy, a regulatory approach providing for an
identical price in front-end and back-end acquisitions is sensible. Likely
missing, however, is the present value of the consideration received.
Freeze-out consideration is paid after that which is paid to shareholders
who spontaneously tender their shares. The time lag is not dramatic, but,
depending on the specific legal system and the transaction in question, it
might be a few weeks to several months. Rarely is interest or other
compensation for the delay granted to shareholders that are forced out in
the initial stages, and this element, of itself, might pressure these share-
holders to tender in the front-end offer. After all, no rational investors
would opt to receive $100 a month from now when they could obtain
the same amount today. 164
164. European regulation provides for an additional, important rule that represents the other
side of the coin of the freeze-out right. According to Article 16 of the Takeover Directive, in the
same circumstances in which the controlling shareholder might exercise her buyout rights follow-
ing a tender offer, every single minority shareholder has a sell-out right. Directive 2004/25/EC,
supra note 141, art 16. Pursuant to this rule, a shareholder can force the controlling shareholder
who has not exercised her freeze-out right to buy his shares at the same price and conditions regu-
lated by Article 15. While the freeze-out right must be exercised on all the outstanding shares, the
sell-out right can be exercised within a three month window from the closing of the triggering
tender offer, also solely by some minority shareholders, with the result that the controlling share-
holder will not become the single owner of the corporation. This provision is designed to empow-
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Table 2 synthesizes the structure of Article 15 of the Takeover Direc-
tive.
TA13LE 2: FREEZE-OUT PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 15 OF THE EU TAKEOVER
DIRECTIVE
Type offreeze-out
rights that Member Triggering Minimum Thresholds Consideration
States can implement ground offer
From 90 to 95% (de-
Article termined by the Mem- Same as in the trigger-"Single threshold" 15(2)(a) Voluntary or ber State) of the voting ing offer or cash. If a
mandatory capital and voting noncash consideration
offer on all rights in the target is offered in the trig-
voting secur- gering offer, Member
itis e 90% of the voting cap- States can mandate a
"Majority of the minor- Article ital and 90% of the
ity" 15(2)(b) shares comprised in
the offer
Fair Price: If triggering offer is mandatory, offer's price is presumed fair. If triggering offer is volunta-
ry, and 90% of the shares comprised in the offer have been tendered, offer's price is presumed fair. All
other cases are not regulated by the Directive; different solutions are adopted in different Member
States.
F. Implementation of Freeze-Out Rights in Some European
Member States
Having discussed the overall framework of the Takeover Directive,
this Article now examines how some Member States have implemented
its provisions in light of the different regulatory options left open by the
European Legislature.
First, it is possible to distinguish between jurisdictions that opt for the
Takeover Directive Article 15(2)(a) single threshold freeze-out and
those that adopt the Takeover Directive Article 15(2)(b) majority of the
minority freeze-out. In the former, it is possible to further distinguish
er minority shareholders and is relevant from at least two related points of view. On the one hand,
if the minimum freeze-out price seems to be particularly convenient for minority shareholders,
the controlling shareholder cannot unilaterally refuse to buy the remaining outstanding shares. On
the other hand, the provision might reduce the pressure to tender in the front-end offer, because
the decision to acquire the nontendered securities is shared between the controlling shareholder
and every single minority shareholder. As the former has the power to unilaterally buy the shares,
the latter has the power to have his shares bought at a fair price. For an analysis of the economics
of sell-out rights, see Burkart & Panunzi, supra note 5. This right represents an important differ-
ence between the American and the European systems.
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countries that have conditioned the exercise of freeze-out rights upon
the acquisition of 90% of all shares from those that set a 95% threshold.
FIGURE 1: IMPLEMENTATION OF FREEZE-OUT RIGHTS IN SOME EU
MEMBER STATES
Potug~
Member State adopting the "Single-Threshold" Freeze-Out Right
[7 Member State adopting the "Majority of the Minority" Freeze-Out Right
Member State requiring both the "Single-Threshold" and "Majority of the Minority"
conditions to exercise Freeze-Out Right
Figure 1 illustrates that the vast majority of continental European
countries adopt the single-threshold option. This reflects path depen-
dency, as most countries applied this or a similar approach even before
the Takeover Directive went into effect.' 65 The only two European
states that have adopted the pure form of the majority of the minority
freeze-out are the United Kingdom' 66 and Ireland, 67 where the right to
165. See, e.g., Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGB1. I S. at
1089, last amended by Gesetz, July 31, 2009, BGB1. I S. at 2509, § 327a (F.R.G.) (requiring a
single threshold of 95%); see also Testo Unico della Finanza, § 111, Decree-Law of Feb. 24,
1998, No. 58, Gazz. Uff., Mar. 26, 1998, no. 71 - Suppl. Ord. no. 52 (Italy).
166. See Companies Act, 2006, c.46, § 979 (U.K.).
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buy out minorities is conditioned on acquiring at least 90% of the shares
included in the triggering tender offer. Even in this case, the solution
adopted is coherent with path dependency, as it confirms the pre-
Directive approach.
A different solution is provided in Portugal and Spain. In these two
jurisdictions, the conditions set forth in Article 15.2(a) and 15.2(b) of
the Takeover Directive have been combined, and both conditions-
acquiring 90% of the total voting rights and 90% of the voting rights in-
cluded in the bid-are required to allow the squeeze-out of minori-
ties. 168
Figure 2 illustrates the Member States that, having opted for the sin-
gle threshold freeze-out, have chosen the highest possible threshold of
95%, as allowed by the Directive. States that have adopted the majority
of the minority freeze-out right did not have any choice in terms of thre-
shold, which is fixed by the Takeover Directive at 90% of the shares in-
cluded in the triggering tender offer.
167. See Companies Act, 1963, § 204 (Ir.).
168. See Takeover Directive Implementation Report, supra note 157, at 18. With respect to
Portuguese law, it is worth pointing out that in addition to the freeze-out rules specifically appli-
cable to listed corporations, there are also provisions allowing controlling shareholders of a close-
ly-held corporation to buy out minority shareholders. These provisions, which will not be ad-




FIGURE 2: IMPLEMENTATION OF FREEZE-OUT RIGHTS IN SOME EU
MEMBER STATES
U d f -Denmrark
Kingdom
Portugal , ,
W Member State adopting a 90% "Single-Threshold" Freeze-Out Right
I Member State adopting a 95% "Single-Threshold" Freeze-Out Right
Member State adopting a 90% "Majority of the Minority" Freeze-Out Right
SMember State adopting both a 90% "Single-Threshold" and a 90%
"Majority of the Minority" Freeze-Out Right
The map in Figure 2 illustrates that most continental European sys-
tems adopt the single-threshold approach, and also that, in the largest
economies, the threshold triggering the freeze-out right is set at the
highest possible level, 95%. This clearly affects the possibility of con-
ducting a public-to-private transaction.
A second important comparative difference to point out among Euro-
pean countries that regulate freeze-outs pursuant to Takeover Directive
Article 15 concerns the type of consideration offered to minority share-
holders and the fair price presumption. As previously mentioned, the
Takeover Directive provides relatively straightforward rules: Considera-
tion shall be the same as that tendered in the triggering offer, but it can
also always be in cash. Member States can also provide that, when non-
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cash consideration is offered, cash must be offered as an alternative.'
69
As for the fairness of the price, the Directive distinguishes between
freeze-outs triggered by mandatory and voluntary offers. In the first
case, the price of the mandatory offer (the highest paid by the offeror in
a period six to twelve months preceding the offer, according to the indi-
vidual determination of the particular Member State) is presumed
fair. 170 In the second case, the price of a voluntary offer is considered
fair if the bid obtained at least 90% of the shares included in the offer.
171
The Takeover Directive does not clarify whether these presumptions are
absolute or can be rebutted, and it leaves to Member States how to regu-
late fair price determinations when none of these presumptions apply.
Within this general framework, different Member States have intro-
duced specific variations concerning the minimum fair price and its de-
termination. On the one hand, some countries plainly adopt the ap-
proach set forth in Article 15(5)of the Takeover Directive and always
deem fair the price of a triggering mandatory offer or of a voluntary of-
fer if the offer reaches a 90% acceptance rate. This approach is followed
in Italy and the Slovak Republic.
172
On the other hand, a larger group of countries provides for more arti-
culated rules. Numerous local variations exist, but the jurisdictions de-
parting from the basic rule try to accomplish a higher level of protection
for minority shareholders. While Member States cannot lower the min-
imum price provisions set forth in Article 15 of the Directive, the
enactment of more rigorous rules is compatible with the language of Ar-
ticle 15.
In countries that require "something more" than the Directive, the
legislative techniques through which freeze-out prices are regulated can
be ascribed to two families: (1) provisions of presumptions of fairness
that are stricter than the ones provided for by the Directive, and (2) pro-
visions that require or facilitate the appraisal of the shares by third party
169. Directive 2004/25/EEC, supra note 141, art. 5(5).
170. Id. art. 5(4).
171. Id. art. 15(5).
172. On Italy, see Articles 111(2) and 108(3) of the Testo Unico della Finanza, Decree-Law
of Feb. 24, 1998, No. 58, Gazz. Uff., Mar. 26, 1998, no. 71 - Suppl. Ord. no. 52 (Italy), and Lu-
cia Picardi, Italy, in TAKEOVER BIDS IN EUROPE, supra note 153, at 416. On the Slovak Republic,
see Branislav Hazucha & Michaela Jurkovi, Slovak Republic, in COMMON LEGAL FRAMEWORK
FOR TAKEOVER BIDS IN EUROPE 375 (Dirk Van Gerven ed., 2008). One important difference be-
tween the two countries is that in the former, if the voluntary bid does not reach the required thre-
shold, the freeze-out price is determined by the Stock Exchange Commission, taking into account
the market prices of the last six months and the offer price, while in the latter, the price must be
equal to the one that would have been required in the case of a mandatory offer.
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expert or court review, either automatically or upon demand by minority
shareholders.
In some jurisdictions, for instance, the price of a voluntary tender of-
fer and that of a mandatory offer is considered fair for freeze-out pur-
poses only if 90% of the shares included in the offer have been ten-
dered. Spain and the United Kingdom follow this approach. This
represents an additional requirement when compared to Takeover Direc-
tive Article 15(5)'s default rule by which the price of a mandatory ten-
der offer is always considered fair, regardless of the level of acceptance
of the offer.
173
The German model is even more complicated. First, in implementing
the Takeover Directive, the German legislature decided to allow freeze-
outs following tender offers only when the 95% threshold is reached
through a mandatory tender offer or a voluntary offer launched to obtain
control. 174 Under the relevant statute, the Wertpapiererwerbs- und
(bernahmegesetz, freeze-out rights are not available to a shareholder
already controlling the corporation (for instance, a shareholder holding
60% of the voting shares) who can simply launch a voluntary tender of-
fer on the remaining shares. Even if the Directive allows the price of a
voluntary tender offer to be freely determined by the offeror, the price
of the voluntary offer launched to gain control cannot be lower than the
price of a hypothetical mandatory tender offer, determined to be the
highest price paid by the offeror in the six months preceding the bid.175
This price is presumed fair for freeze-out purposes only if the bidder has
acquired more than 90% of the securities included in the triggering of-
fer, independent of its mandatory or voluntary nature. 
176
The German model indicates how some Member States have pro-
vided for particularly strict rules compared to other European jurisdic-
tions-rules that limit the ability of the controlling shareholder to freeze
out minorities or make it generally more financially burdensome, ceteris
paribus, than in other jurisdictions.
173. Clearly enough, in member states that have adopted the majority of the minority freeze-
out rule, this condition is always met, otherwise it would not be possible to exercise the freeze-out
right in the first place.
174. See Wertpapiererwerbs- und Ubernahmegesetz [WpUG] [Securities Acquisition and
Takeover Act], Dec. 20, 2001, BGB1. I S at 3822, last amended by Gesetz, July 30, 2009, BGB1.
I S. at 2479, § 31(3) (F.R.G.).
175. See id.
176. The German legislature did not expressly regulate what happens when the 90% threshold
is not reached, and the fair price presumption does not apply. A judicial procedure to determine
the fairness of the consideration offered will follow, but it is not clear how the burden of proving
fairness will be divided between the offeror and the (contesting) minority shareholders.
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In other systems, further protections are afforded to minorities facing
freeze-out. In some jurisdictions, minorities have recourse to an external
appraiser, either ex ante or ex post. The appraiser might be an indepen-
dent expert, a court, or a national supervisory authority. France provides
an example of this approach: There, the Autorit6 des March~s Finan-
cieres (AMF) must be notified ex ante of the intention to carry out a
freeze-out following a tender offer. The AMF decides whether the con-
ditions required for squeezing out minorities have been met and ex-
amines the shares submitted by the offeror, assigning different weights
to elements such as the value of the corporate assets, past earnings,
market value, and business prospects. 
177
In the absence of meaningful empirical evidence, it is virtually im-
possible to say whether the French approach leads, in general, to higher
or lower freeze-out prices. For the purpose of this Article, it is simply
worth noting that this approach provides for another variation on the
theme, and the need to comply with this procedure might affect the
smoothness of a freeze-out.
The last few paragraphs have demonstrated how Member States have
adopted a wide variety of approaches to implement the freeze-out provi-
sions of the Takeover Directive. Differences exist in the conditions that
trigger the freeze-out right, the applicable fair-price presumptions, and
even in the regulatory strategies employed by each Member State. This
veritable mosaic of approaches symbolizes the compromise underlying
the numerous options contained in the Takeover Directive and
represents, in itself, a possible obstacle to the creation of a truly inte-
grated corporate control market for cross-border acquisitions. This final
point will be argued more extensively in Part IV.B.
G. Alternative Ways to Freeze Out Minority Shareholders in Some
European Jurisdictions
Before providing a critical comparison of the different systems, a few
more words are necessary on freeze-outs in European countries. In some
jurisdictions, freeze-out rights based on Takeover Directive Article 15
are not the exclusive means by which controlling shareholders can un-
ilaterally cash out minorities. Two examples of additional procedures
are the United Kingdom's "scheme of arrangement," and Germany's
Aktiengesetz (AktG) Articles 327a ff. Each is briefly considered.
Pursuant to British law:
177. Simon, supra note 157, at 256.
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A "scheme of arrangement" or a "reconstruction" under [Com-
panies Act] 2006, Part 26 and Part 27 (additional requirements
for public companies) enables a company to effect mergers and
amalgamations, and also to alter the rights of its members or its
creditors, with the sanction of the court. The provisions are suf-
ficiently wide to accommodate schemes having a considerable
diversity of objectives and range of complexity, which may in-
volve more than one company .... Unless the court orders oth-
erwise, the members or creditors who dissent are nevertheless
bound to accept the terms of the scheme. 1
78
Thus, a "scheme of arrangement" is a flexible procedure used to
reach a broad variety of outcomes with the approval of a court. Theoret-
ically, this technique can be employed to cash out minorities. Existing
case law is limited on the subject, however, and doubts remain as to
whether the procedure is as streamlined as a short-form merger in the
United States. An example of a case where the scheme of arrangement
was employed is In re Hellenic & General Trust Ltd.,179 where Ham-
bros intended to buy all of the outstanding shares of Hellenic. The
transaction was approved at the general shareholders' meeting by a
large majority of the votes. It was opposed, however, by minority share-
holders, in particular, the National Greek Bank, which held 14% of the
shares. The court did not sanction this scheme. Rather, it required a pos-
itive vote of the majority of the (nonaffiliated) minority as a "different
class., 180 The case is illustrative of a certain reluctance to allow a
scheme of arrangement for freeze-out purposes when shareholders could
otherwise be cashed out pursuant to Article 974ff of the Companies Act
of 2006, implemented pursuant to Takeover Directive Article 15. The
British scheme of arrangement therefore does not appear equivalent to
the U.S. cash-out merger and can be considered a much more uncertain,
lengthy, and potentially expensive cash-out technique, if it is one at all.
Sections 327a through 327f of the German AktG also provide a
means by which to freeze out minorities outside the scope of Takeover
Directive Article 15, while at the same time granting meaningful protec-
178. LEN SEALY & SARAH WORTHINGTON, CASES AND MATERIALS IN COMPANY LAW 605
(8th ed. 2008). I wish to thank David Cabrelli and Paul Davies for discussing with me the scheme
of arrangement as a possible way to cash out minorities in the United Kingdom. Email from Da-
vid Cabrelli, Lecturer, Univ. of Edinburgh Sch. of Law, to author (Aug. 14th, 2009) (on file with
author); Email from Paul Davies, Professor, Univ. of Oxford, to author (Aug. 14th, 2009) (on file
with author). Obviously, mistakes on this issue are solely mine.
179. 1 W.L.R. 123 (Ch. 1976); see also SEALEY & WORTHINGTON, supra note 178, at 610.
180. In re Hellenic & General Trust Ltd., 1 W.L.R. 123, 123 (Ch. 1976).
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tions for minority shareholders. This procedure is available when a
shareholder holds 95% of the shares.' 81 In short, the controlling share-
holder convenes a meeting of all shareholders to approve the cash-out
procedure. 8 2 Because the squeeze-out is not preceded by any tender of-
fer, the fairness of the cash-out price cannot be determined based on
presumptions regarding the price of the triggering offer.' 83 Rather, a
court-appointed expert evaluates the fairness of the proposed price. The
expert's positive opinion limits the possibility of challenging the trans-
action in court.'
84
While this particular procedure clearly broadens the possibility to
squeeze out minorities and is quite flexible, it is still significantly stric-
ter than the American short-form merger. The controlling shareholder,
in fact, must own a very high percentage of shares, close to 100%, in
order to exercise her freeze-out right.
In conclusion, Article 15 of the Takeover Directive is not the exclu-
sive freeze-out provision in all European jurisdictions. But, to the extent
that other rules exist in Member States, they are significantly less liberal
than in the United States. This follows naturally from the bedrock Euro-
pean principle that minority shareholders enjoy a quasi-absolute right to
remain members of the corporation in which they have invested. Be-
cause these additional freeze-out provisions are generally ineffectual,
exist in only a handful of Member States, and lack harmonization, they
do not undermine the reform proposals advanced in the final Part of this
Article.
IV. AN EXPLANATION FOR THE DIFFERENCES IN THE REGULATION OF
FREEZE-OUT TRANSACTIONS
A. Comparative Differences in Context
In the preceding analysis, this Article has considered some of the
most important differences concerning freeze-out transactions in the
United States and Europe. Before discussing the causes and conse-
quences of these differences, a brief recapitulation is necessary.
181. See AktG, supra note 165, § 327a; see also VOLKER EMMERICH & MATHIAS
HABERSACK, AKTiEN- UND GMBH-KONZERNRECHT § 327a, 1-31 (2008).
182. See id.
183. See AktG, supra note 165, § 327b; see also EMMERICH & HABERSACK, supra note 181,
§ 327a, 3-9.




In the United States, freezing out minorities wihout their consent and
going private is, generally speaking, easier than in Europe. Two major
techniques are available and usually followed: the long-form, cash-out
merger and the tender offer followed by a short-form merger. In both
cases, the emphasis in terms of protection of minorities is not based on
an absolute right for minorities to remain shareholders, but rather on en-
suring that the cashed-out investors obtain the fair value of their shares.
Dissenting minority shareholders can either exercise their right to ap-
praisal and have their shares valued though a court proceeding, or chal-
lenge the merger on one of several possible grounds. The former reme-
dy, for the reasons discussed above, is not particularly effective. The
latter remedy is more widely used and extensive case law exists on the
subject.
When challenged in court, a one-step, long-form merger with a con-
trolling corporation is considered a self-dealing transaction and is there-
fore subject to the entire fairness standard of judicial review, a standard
significantly less deferential to directors than the business judgment
rule. Normally, the defendants must positively prove entire fairness. If,
however, certain procedural protections are adopted in approving the
deal, the burden of proving (un)fairness is shifted to the plaintiffs. These
procedural protections are either: (1) approval of the deal by a special
committee of independent directors, entrusted with the responsibility of
negotiating the deal with veto power, or (2) approval of the deal by a
majority of the minority shareholders who are not affiliated with the
controlling acquiring corporation.
Alternatively, if a controlling shareholder employs a two-step proce-
dure, for example, a tender offer followed by a short-form merger, the
front-end offer is not subject to any particular standard of review and
the bidder is free to offer the price he or she deems adequate. The trans-
action is, in fact, not a conflict of interest because the bidder and the
minority shareholders are not related parties. In the event of a challenge,
the two-step freeze-out (short-form merger) is reviewed subject to the
deferential business judgment rule standard if the controlling sharehold-
er meets three conditions: (1) the tender offer is subject to a nonwaiva-
ble majority of the minority condition; (2) the bidder assumes the obli-
gation to effectuate the short-form merger, if she reaches the necessary
threshold, promptly after the conclusion of the bid and at the same price
and conditions by which the offer was launched; and (3) the buyer does
not engage in any retributive threat capable of manipulating the deci-
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sion-making process of the shareholders with respect to accepting or re-
jecting the offer.
The European scenario presents significant differences but also some
interesting similarities. Generally speaking, there are fewer situations in
which a controlling shareholder can unilaterally decide to cash out mi-
norities. Cash-out mergers are not available in the vast majority of EU
Member States. Even in those jurisdictions where transactions leading
to similar results are hypothetically possible, they are not generally em-
ployed. In any case, they present significant differences, and less flex-
ibility, than the American cash-out merger.
85
Nonetheless, mergers are still employed as a means to go private and
delist by creating pressure on minority shareholders to sell their shares.
In general terms, however, consideration for all shareholders of a corpo-
ration to be extinguished by way of merger must be, at least in part,
shares of the surviving entity.
In Europe, the principal mode for going private, harmonized by the
Takeover Directive, is a statutory freeze-out right following a mandato-
ry or voluntary tender offer on all outstanding shares. In the single-
threshold freeze-out (more common in continental Europe), the control-
ling shareholder/bidder obtains between 90% and 95% of all the out-
standing shares and voting rights in the triggering offer. In the majority
of the minority freeze-out (the British rule), the controlling sharehold-
er/bidder obtains 90% of the shares included in the offer. At this point,
in either regime, the controlling shareholder forces minority sharehold-
ers out by purchasing their shares at a fair price. The price of the trig-
gering offer is generally considered fair if it is at least equal to the price
of the mandatory offer or-more relevant for our purposes-equal to
that of the voluntary offer when a minimum of 90% of the securities in-
volved have been tendered. Different local variations of this rule exist in
Member States.
Looking at the overall structure of this rule and how it has been im-
plemented in most Member States, we can point out its differences and
similarities with respect to the Delaware two-step freeze-out.
185. Consider, for example, the possibility of using a scheme of arrangement under British
law, or Section 327a of the German Corporation Statute. See AktG, supra note 165, IV.7. It
should be noted, in addition, that even a U.K. scheme of arrangement would require approval of
the majority of the minority to be permissible. Even when compared with the unique British ap-
proach, American law is, in this respect, significantly more flexible. In the United States, a cash-
out merger, in fact, can always be unilaterally approved by the majority shareholders: approval by
a majority of the minority simply has the effect of shifting the burden of proving entire fairness if
the merger is challenged in court. It is not a condition for the consummation of the deal.
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First, in Europe as in the United States, the unilateral acquisition fol-
lows a tender offer. However, the European system is more flexible than
that of the United States because the second step of the freeze-out does
not need to be a merger in which the target corporation is merged with
and into the parent. Rather, following the exercise of the freeze-out
right, the European subsidiary can survive as a corporation of a single
shareholder.
Second, with respect to the percentage of shares that must be ac-
quired to cash-out minorities, European law is more rigid than its Amer-
ican counterpart. Under Delaware law, a unilateral short-form cash-out
merger is possible where the controlling shareholder reaches 90% of
capital. In Europe, the threshold is higher: The majority of the countries
adopting the single-threshold freeze-out opt for a 95% threshold. The
few countries that follow the majority-of-the-minority freeze-out require
that the bidder acquire at least 90% of the shares included in the offer on
all the outstanding shares. Practically speaking, this means that the bid-
der must obtain more than 90% of all the outstanding shares because
freeze-outs are rarely pursued by a subject that launches an offer with-
out already owning substantial participation in the target corporation.
A very simple example can clarify this point. A controlling share-
holder holds 60% of the common stock of a corporation that has only
issued one class of equity securities. If he wants to freeze out minorities
in the United States, he can opt for a cash-out long-form merger or
launch a tender offer followed by a short-form merger. In this second
case, he would have to acquire an additional 30% of the outstanding
common stock. On the contrary, in Germany-a country adopting the
single-threshold freeze-out-the bidder would have to purchase at least
35% of the remaining shares. In the United Kingdom, according to the
majority of the minority freeze-out, he would have to acquire 90% of
the remaining 40% (i.e., 36% of the outstanding shares in absolute
terms). Other things being equal, it is more expensive in Europe than in
the United States to achieve a position in which one can actually cash
out minorities.
Third, the European and American regimes diverge on how to deter-
mine the fair price of a freeze-out. On this point, European law is less
favorable to going-private transactions. Though Takeover Directive Ar-
ticle 15(5) and Delaware jurisprudence follow a surprisingly similar rule
for regulating the matter (i.e., both systems presume fairness of the price
offered in the front-end bid only where a majority of the minority ac-
cepts the tender offer), since Pure, a simple majority is sufficient to ap-
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prove the bid in the United States, whereas in Europe the acceptance
rate must be at least 90%.
If our controlling shareholder starts her acquisition owning 82% of
the shares, Delaware law requires that she tender of a minimum of 9%
(plus one share) of the remaining 18% of the capital for the presumption
of fairness to apply. The bidder will thus reach 91% and be able to ap-
prove a short-form merger. According to the presumption of fairness in
Article 15(5) of the Takeover Directive, the same bidder would need to
obtain at least 16.2% of the shares from the minority, reaching an own-
ership stake as high as 98.2% of the shares. Only in this case, the price
of the front-end tender offer would be considered fair for freeze-out
purposes.
Thus, the European rule implies that "more weight is given to the se-
curities that belong to those rejecting the bid.' ' 186 A minority as small as
10.1% of the owners of the shares included in the offer (less than 2% of
the entire capital!), by rejecting the offer, can rebut the fairness pre-
sumption, notwithstanding the fact that the bid has been accepted by
almost nine shareholders out of ten. When compared to U.S. law, this
approach puts an emphasis on the opinion of the minority of the minori-
ty, rather than on that of the majority of the minority.1
87
Fourth, in Europe, the freeze-out might follow a mandatory tender of-
fer pursuant to Takeover Directive Article 5. This scenario is not direct-
ly comparable to any similar situation in Delaware because the manda-
tory tender offer does not exist in U.S. jurisdictions. 188 It is worth
noting, however, that, in this case, the freeze-out price will need to be
even higher than the one resulting from a triggering voluntary tender of-
fer because the minimum price of the mandatory tender offer is the price
paid by the bidder to acquire control. It is, therefore, a price that in-
cludes a substantial premium for control.
Fifth, Delaware and EU freeze-out doctrines each require that for the
presumption of fairness to apply, the second step of the acquisition
(short-form merger in the United States, statutory buyout in Europe)
must be completed within a set time limit after the acquisition. The pur-
186. Kaisanlahti, supra note 5, at 507.
187. Id. at 507.
188. See Marco Ventoruzzo, Europe's Thirteenth Directive and US. Takeover Regulation:
Regulatory Means and Political and Economic Ends, 41 TEX. INT'L L.J. 171, 189 (2006). It
should be pointed out, however, that some anti-takeover devices allowed in some U.S. jurisdic-
tions rely on mechanisms similar to the mandatory bid in that they require a raider to acquire all
the outstanding shares. See Peter V. Letsou, Are Dead Hand (and No Hand) Poison Pills Really
Dead?, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1101, 1105 (2006).
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pose of this rule is clear: The later the second step is completed, the
higher the pressure is on minority shareholders to sell their shares at the
initial tender. In short, the present value of consideration at the second
step of the freeze-out is clearly lower in the absence of corrective me-
chanisms, such as the payment of interest rates. But whereas Delaware
law requires simply that the short-form merger be consummated
"promptly" after the tender offer (to date, a generic and elastic require-
ment), the Takeover Directive requires that the short-form merger occur
within three months of the conclusion of the tender offer.
A sixth, and final, distinction concerns the requirement set forth in
Pure that in order to presume the fairness of a two-step freeze-out, the
acquiring corporation cannot pose any retributive threat to minority
shareholders. As elusive and difficult to apply as this requirement might
be, it is an important bastion for avoiding coercion of minorities. The
Takeover Directive does not address this issue, which would largely be
regulated by the national laws of individual jurisdictions. To the extent
that it is possible to generalize, in some systems, similar conduct might
theoretically be considered a breach of controlling shareholders' fidu-
ciary duties. However, it is fair to say that, in the absence of specific
statutory or case law limitations, even assuming that a duty to restrain
from retributive threats could be established, it would be very difficult
to enforce such a duty. In addition, in terms of regulatory technique, this
requirement is a typical example of a "standard," as opposed to a
"rule." 189 As such, it would probably be less easily and effectively ap-
plied in continental civil law systems than in common law systems
where the accumulation of precedents contributes to specifying the con-
tent of the requirement.
In sum, under EU law, it is more difficult to squeeze out minority
shareholders than in the United States. Not only is one of America's
primary going-private vehicles-the one-step, long-form cash-out mer-
ger-generally unavailable in Europe, but the Takeover Directive's sta-
tutory freeze-out right, notwithstanding similarities to the American
two-step freeze-out, is less accessible to controlling shareholders for
reasons already stated.
Needless to say, numerous complicated factors, and not only legal
ones, interact to determine whether freeze-outs are really more difficult
and costly for controlling shareholders in Europe, a question that should
189. For the distinction between these regulatory techniques, see Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW, sU-
pra note 114, at 21, 23.
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also be defined somewhat differently with respect to different corporate
law jurisdictions. However, empirical evidence appears to confirm both
the general picture described in the previous pages and the conclusion
that stems from it. 190
B. Causes and Consequences of the Diverging Approaches
Different overlapping elements explain the origins of different ap-
proaches to freeze-outs in the United States and in Europe. The interac-
tions among these elements are complicated and nuanced, and this Ar-
ticle does not capture all of them. It does, however, seek to spell out
some of the most crucial ones. 191 Four explanations for the comparative
differences can be identified: (1) the federal structure of the American
corporate law system and the related chartering competition among
states, (2) the risks and costs of litigation associated with the status of
listed corporations, (3) the potential role of freeze-out rules or the ab-
sence thereof as a springboard for hostile corporate acquisitions or a
protection for entrenched shareholders, and (4) a path-dependency phe-
nomenon linked to how the legal system and local culture have tradi-
tionally envisioned the property rights of shareholders.
The first reason that explains the existence of a more flexible freeze-
out regime in the United States can be found in regulatory competition
among states and the existence of a market for corporate charters. 192 The
190. See Toby Stuart & Soojin Yim, Board Interlocks and the Propensity to be Targeted in
Private Equity Transactions (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14189, 2008),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl4 189.pdf.
191. An additional cautionary note is that, as in most comparative analysis, causes and conse-
quences might be difficult to tell apart. The very fact that a given freeze-out regime is adopted
affects the development of the legal system from which it stems. For example, a rule designed for
working in systems that do not typically rely, or rely less, on judicial intervention, is likely to be
less well-suited to being enforced in court, thus further limiting recourse to lawsuits.
192. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 148-51 (1993).
The literature on regulatory competition in corporate law is extensive. The following are some of
the "classical" contributions. Among the supporters of the idea that the incorporation principle
leads to a "race to the top," in addition to Romano, see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R.
FISHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 212-27 (1991); Ralph K. Winter,
State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251,
290 (1977); Ralph K. Winter, The "Race for the Top" Revisited: A Comment on Eisenberg, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1526, 1528 (1989). For examples of authors more critical of the beneficial ef-
fects of regulatory competition, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The
Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1486-88
(1992); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race to Pro-
tect Managers from Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1168 (1999); Lucian A. Bebchuk et al.,
Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775, 1820
(2002); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE
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scholarly debate has largely explained the different dynamics of regula-
tory competition in the United States and Europe, to the extent that cor-
porate mobility exists in Europe.1 93 There is little doubt that a regime
that facilitates going private can be appealing for decision-makers when
selecting the jurisdiction of incorporation. This conclusion holds both
because freeze-out rules can be an important driver for regulatory com-
petition and because corporate jurisdictions generally characterized by a
more permissive approach are likely to offer more flexible rules con-
cerning freeze-outs. The limited role of the market for corporate char-
ters in Europe, especially with respect to public corporations or corpora-
tions considering going public, which could potentially be more
interested in going private in the future, supports the conclusion that
legislatures and policy makers have few incentives to facilitate these
types of transactions. 
194
The second, and related, explanation concerns the risk of litigation.
To the extent that a system relies on litigation to enforce shareholder
rights, going private will be an attractive option to controlling share-
holders. In the United States more than in Europe, buying out minority
shareholders eliminates the risk of future derivative suits and class ac-
tions, and its value is directly correlated with the potential costs asso-
ciated with these events for the corporation, its controlling shareholders,
L.J. 663, 705 (1974). For a general discussion of regulatory competition, see Joel P. Trachtman,
International Regulatory Competition, Externalization, and Jurisdiction, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 47,
59-81 (1993). For an examination of the issue of regulatory competition in securities regulation,
see Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not In-
vestment Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1999); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A
Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998); Frederick Tung, Lost in
Translation: From U.S. Corporate Charter Competition to Issuer Choice in International Securi-
ties Regulation, 39 GA. L. REV. 525 (2005).
193. For a discussion of how the recent jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice might
have affected corporate mobility in Europe, see Marco Becht et al., Where Do Firms Incorpo-
rate? Deregulation and the Cost of Entry, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 241 (2008).
194. Marco Ventoruzzo, "Cost-based" and "Rules-based" Regulatory Competition: Markets
for Corporate Charters in the U.S. and in the E.U., 3 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 92 (2006). It is impor-
tant to clarify a couple of matters that have been pointed out to me by Geoffrey P. Miller. The
role of regulatory competition in fostering "easy" freeze-out rules in the United States can be am-
biguous. In fact, the major actors that might desire this regulatory approach are acquirers that are
not always incorporated in Delaware, and who therefore have little influence (at least in terms of
threat to leave the state) on the local policy makers. On the other hand, target corporations, which
are often incorporated in Delaware, do have the possibility to influence the Delaware legislature,
but only some of them have an interest in being sold. Targets fearing this possibility might prefer
rules that create obstacles to going private. The implied assumption in the explanation of the pe-
culiar American approach to freeze-outs based on regulatory competition is that the forces push-
ing for "easy" freeze-out are stronger than the possible opposition. Email from Geoffrey P. Mil-
ler, Professor, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, to author (Nov. 25, 2009) (on file with author).
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directors, and managers. It is true that going private itself is often a cata-
lyst for litigation. Nonetheless, corporate insiders might prefer to face a
"controlled" risk of litigation for one specific transaction, minimizing
the risk by complying with the now well-established Delaware case law,
rather than remaining exposed to potential lawsuits as a listed corpora-
tion.
Vis-d-vis the higher potential relevance of litigation associated with
publicly-held status, it is therefore not surprising that freeze-out rules
emerged as a pivotal issue in the United States earlier and more force-
ftilly than in Europe. For American legislatures and judges it became
crucial, especially in light of regulatory competition among states, to fa-
cilitate going-private transactions while protecting the value of the in-
vestment of minority shareholders.
This last motivation for the different development of freeze-out rules
opens the door to a more general, and probably more cynical, remark
from a public choice perspective. The idea that in most civil law sys-
tems private benefits of control are higher than in the United States is
coherent with the observation that legislatures face less pressure from
controlling shareholders, managers, and their lobbies to facilitate going-
private transactions. A lower level of minority protection reduces the
risks and costs associated with the status of a publicly held corporation.
In other words, and more bluntly: In Europe, controlling shareholders
and directors might be less eager to buy out minority shareholders be-
cause the likelihood of litigation (and losing this litigation) is low while
the possibility of exploiting the private benefits of control are more sig-
nificant than in the United States.'95
But there is even more. Barriers to going-private transactions might
have a protective effect for incumbent controlling shareholders against
hostile acquisitions. It can be a sort of implied antitakeover measure,
which has not really been examined by scholars and policy makers. It is
intuitive that many hostile acquisitions in the form of leveraged buyouts
and management buyouts can be sustained financially only by bringing
the corporation private and cashing out minorities. This might be the
case for different reasons, perhaps because of the tax benefits of substi-
tuting equity with debt, or because the debt incurred to take over the
corporation can be serviced only by cutting compliance expenses, or be-
cause the corporation needs an organizational turnaround that cannot be
195. See Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998). This moti-
vation for the different development of freeze-out rules in Europe and in the United States has
also been noted by Geoffrey P. Miller. Email from Geoffrey P. Miller, supra note 194.
[Vol. 50:4
FREEZE-OUTS
effectively and efficiently accomplished in the presence of minority
shareholders.
When potential buyers know that achieving a position in which they
can unilaterally cash out minorities is difficult, especially with the op-
position of the existing controlling shareholder, the risk of not being
able to obtain 100% of the outstanding shares might discourage hostile
acquisitions. It can therefore be argued that, in states with concentrated
ownership structures that do not favor the proliferation of hostile acqui-
sitions, stricter rules concerning freeze-outs might also serve as an indi-
rect, but relatively effective, deterrent to some takeovers, to the advan-
tage of existing controlling shareholders.
1 96
A fourth and final explanation for the different approaches to freeze-
outs in the United States and Europe can be found in a cultural relic
concerning the legal qualification of the interests of minority sharehold-
ers in the corporation. Most continental European systems emphasize
the property rights of the single shareholder over the shares she owns
and consider most forced acquisitions an infringement of the right to
own property. 197 In some Member States, freeze-out statutory rights
have even raised constitutional law challenges on the grounds that they
might be considered unconstitutional takings based on private, rather
than public, interests. 198
196. The fact that equity buy-out activity in Europe is as relevant as in the United States, if
not more, Luca Enriques, EC Company Law Directives and Regulations: How Trivial Are They?,
27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1, 39 (2006), does not contradict this point because the distinction
drawn in the text concerns hostile acquisitions, which appear to be significantly less common in
continental Europe than in common law systems. See John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who
Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why?-The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and UK.
Takeover Regulation, 95 GEO. L.J. 1727, 1738 (2007); Marina Martynova & Luc Renneboog,
Mergers and Acquisitions in Europe 42 (Eur. Corporate Governance Inst. Finance, Working Pa-
per No. 114/2006, 2006), available at http://www.ssm.com/asbtract-id=880379; Ventoruzzo,
supra note 144, at 170.
197. GERMAIN, supra note 112.
198. For example, the Czech Republic's Constitutional Court addressed this issue in 2008 and
not only denied the unconstitutionality of the freeze-out right implemented pursuant to Article 15
of the Takeover Directive, but also observed that the rule might raise some questions of compati-
bility with the constitutional protection of property rights. See nAlez Ustavniho soudo j. 56/05 /
2008 / Sbirka ndlezu a usneseni 0stavniho soudo, available in English at http://www.usoud.cz/
clanek/726. Also, the German Federal Constitutional Court confirmed the constitutionality of
freeze-outs, holding that Section 327a is not in conflict with the constitutional right to property, as
in Section 14 GG. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Sept.
19, 2007, 1 BvR 2984/06 (F.R.G.). The issue of the constitutionality of freeze-out rights of con-
trolling shareholders has also been discussed in Italy. In a lawsuit brought by a minority share-
holder of the listed corporation Cartiere Burgo, the question was raised as to whether freeze-out
rights are compatible with the Italian Constitution. In Italy, a local judge can decide whether there
are sufficient grounds to submit the question to the Constitutional Court. The local court, howev-
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Allowing controlling shareholders to unilaterally buy out minorities
is at odds with this view. In Europe, it is still the dominant view that
cashing-out minorities should be possible only in extreme circums-
tances. This approach assumes that the best protection of minority
shareholders consists in allowing them to hold on to their shares.
In the United States, on the other hand, the prevailing perspective is
that minority shareholders are primarily investors with a financial inter-
est in the corporation. Accordingly, the appropriate form of protection
for minority shareholders is to guarantee a fair value on their invest-
ment. Additional flexibility for controlling shareholders and managers
in designing the financial structure of the corporation, including the op-
tion to exit the equity market, is compatible with the interests of the mi-
nority, so long as minority interests are liquidated at fair value in a coer-
cion-free environment. This view assumes that with the consideration
received, minority shareholders can find alternative investments in a ro-
bust, efficient market.
V. PRESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
A. What the United States Can Learn from Europe
The comparison between the European and U.S. approaches to
freeze-outs shows a combination of striking similarities and profound
differences. The similarities concern the general rationale underlying
both the tender offer/short-form merger in U.S. jurisdictions following
the Delaware model and the statutory freeze-out in Europe pursuant to
Takeover Directive Article 15. The first lesson to draw from these simi-
larities is that very different systems, originating from distinct perspec-
tives and characterized by dissimilar law-making processes have none-
theless converged toward a common framework. This is not only an
interesting theoretical observation, but it offers some support to the
soundness of Delaware jurisprudence in Pure and its progeny.
er, dismissed the constitutionality issue three times, both at the preliminary injunction stage and at
the merits stage. See Trib. di Milano, 13 Mar. 2003, SocietA, 1, 87 (observing that freeze-out
rights are compatible with Article 42 of the Italian Constitution, and stating that private property
can be taken only for general interest motives, because it balances the mandatory bid provision
and composes a set of rules that protects general interests); Trib. di Milano, 8 June 2001, 1236/48,
Banca Borsa Titoli di Credito 11, 162; Trib. di Milano, 6 Mar. 2001, Socien, 10, 1235. Even if
these constitutional challenges have been dismissed, the very fact that they were raised suggests
the existence of a less favorable approach to freeze-out rules than in the United States.
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Both systems favor freeze-out rights that follow a voluntary tender
offer. The fact that in the front-end tender offer, the two sides (the con-
trolling shareholder and the minority shareholders) deal at arm's length
is taken into account and leads to lower procedural protections for mi-
norities than in the case of a simple merger between the controlling and
the controlled corporations. In Europe, the different treatment of one-
step and two-step freeze-outs is so profound that, as mentioned before,
long-form cash-out mergers are not often possible; while in the United
States, they are possible, but subject to entire fairness review if the con-
ditions spelled out in Weinberger and its progeny are not followed.
The European legislative framework, however, confirms the ap-
proach followed by the Delaware Chancery Court in Pure and sustains
the rationale underlying the provision for different regulatory approach-
es to one-step and two-step freeze-outs-stricter for the former, more
lax for the latter. Obviously, the comparative argument merely has per-
suasive authority, but it is important to notice that different policy mak-
ers regulating some of the most sophisticated financial markets and cor-
porate systems in the world, moving from different perspectives,
reached a similar general framework. This observation provides one ad-
ditional argument in favor of Delaware case law.
A second contribution offered by the comparative analysis is a new
way to improve Delaware law in this area. Rather than overhauling the
existing doctrinal framework, as other scholars propose, the preceding
analysis supports a view that simply fine-tuning the rules set forth in
Pure will have substantial wealth-maximizing effects. The idea is to ad-
just the threshold of the majority of the minority approval requirement.
As discussed earlier, Article 15 of the Takeover Directive provides
for a very high threshold. On the one hand, in order to exercise its
freeze-out right, the controlling shareholder must either reach 90% or
more of the voting capital, or acquire 90% of the shares included in the
tender offer. In addition, the price of the front-end voluntary tender of-
fer is considered fair for freeze-out purposes only if 90% of the shares
included in the offer have been tendered. It is intuitive that the higher
this second threshold is set, the more the price and conditions of the
front-end bid must attract minority shareholders. In other words, requir-
ing greater majority-of-the-minority approval tends to encourage the
controlling shareholders to offer better conditions both in the front-end
offer and in the following freeze-out procedure.
199
199. See supra Part N.A.
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One of the criticisms of the current Delaware approach, in light of the
empirical evidence, is that shareholders could receive less in two-step
freeze-outs than in one-step freeze-outs. 200 As discussed above, the em-
pirical foundations of this critique are questionable, 20 1 but an easy way
to improve, on average, the conditions offered to minority shareholders
and to bridge the gap between the two types of deals (to the extent that
the gap needs to be bridged) could be to slightly adjust the majority of
the minority requirement in Pure from a simple majority to a higher
threshold. Even if (as will be argued in the next Section) the 90% Euro-
pean rule is too demanding and prevents value-maximizing deals, a
middle ground is possible, whereby two thirds of the minority approval
would be required to exercise freeze-out rights. This would be an easy
and flexible way to increase minority protection in the Pure framework,
without contradicting or restructuring the underlying philosophy of De-
laware law.
B. What Europe Can Learn from the United States
In the particular area of the law considered here, there are generally
more lessons that Europe can learn from Delaware and the United States
than the other way around.
First, the preceding analysis suggests that Europe would benefit from
more substantive harmonization of freeze-out rules across jurisdictional
lines. Broader harmonization serves the general goal of achieving a
more integrated European financial market and the more specific goal of
creating a level playing field in the market for corporate control. As
mentioned above, the opportunity to freeze-out minority shareholders is
an important consideration in virtually every acquisition plan, especially
the hostile takeover.20 2 Excessive burdens and divergent local rules
hinder mergers and acquisitions and, in some circumstances, protect en-
trenched controlling shareholders.20 3 On this view, it is surprising that
the debate over the Takeover Directive has focused so little on the link
between corporate acquisitions and freeze-out rules.
The harmonization should proceed in two directions, encompassing
the regulation of mergers and the regulation of statutory freeze-out pro-
200. Subramanian, supra note 4, at 7.
201. See Bates et al., supra note 8, at 29.
202. See supra Part IV.A.
203. As we discussed above, in systems that provide less protection to minority investors,
controlling shareholders are less interested in effective freeze-out provisions because, unfettered
by litigation concerns, they enjoy a greater ability to extract private benefits from the corporation,
notwithstanding the presence of minority shareholders.
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visions set forth in Takeover Directive Article 15. As to the former, Eu-
ropean legislatures should further liberalize cash-out mergers. Such a
move requires a policy shift that corresponds to a more modem vision
of financial markets in which minority shareholders are protected not by
an inalienable right to remain as shareholders, but rather by a right to
receive fair value in exchange for their shares. Value-maximizing cash-
out mergers unlock hidden value, leading to more efficient outcomes.
20 4
Historically, European merger regulation has followed a trajectory simi-
lar to the one observed in the United States.20 5 But the European evolu-
tion stopped short of a consequential step, failing to allow cash-out
mergers even under controlled circumstances. Path dependency and the
desirability for smooth transactions might suggest requiring supermajor-
ity approval for cash-out mergers, but banning these transactions alto-
gether pays mere lip-service to shareholder protection while putting Eu-
ropean markets at a distinct disadvantage when compared to their
American counterpart.
In legal systems that are less reliant on litigation, the fairness of the
cash-out price must be ensured by different techniques than the oppor-
tunity to challenge mergers in court. Also, the typical procedural protec-
tions devised by Delaware law-approval by a committee of indepen-
dent directors or by the majority of the minority-might prove
inadequate in countries characterized by concentrated ownership struc-
tures and extensive cross-ownership connections among listed corpora-
tions.206 Alternative legal instruments, however, can ensure adequate
protection of minorities. In fact, the independent, court-appointed ex-
perts currently employed in European jurisdictions to protect minority
interests in the merger context could be employed as a check against
abusive cash-out offers.
Second, European reform should address freeze-out rights set forth in
Takeover Directive Article 15. More specifically, it should address the
conditions triggering the freeze-out right and the fair price presumption.
As for the former, the single-threshold freeze-out is the more desirable
of the two approaches allowed by the Directive. The majority-of-the-
minority freeze-out, adopted in the United Kingdom and Ireland, makes
it difficult to cash out minorities even in situations where it is reasona-
ble. Convergence toward the single-threshold freeze-out, adopted by the
204. See, e.g., discussion supra note 8.
205. In order to foster the protection of minority shareholders, European legislatures might al-
so explicitly recognize a right of general appraisal in any merger case.
206. See Der Aufsichtsrat in der Rolle des Vorstandsberaters, 124 F.A.Z., May 30, 2009, at
19.
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vast majority of the EU Member States, reduces the risk that minorities
of the minority can scuttle value-maximizing deals. Regarding the latter,
it is too strict to presume fairness only where the front-end bid is ac-
cepted by offerees holding 90% of the outstanding shares. If Delaware
law should require a higher threshold in the two-step freeze-out than the
current simple majority, then European law should require a lower thre-
shold. The current threshold grants excessive relevance to the position
of (a small) minority of the minority.2 °7 Once again, a balanced solution
would condition the presumption of fairness upon the tendering of two
thirds of the shares included in the initial offer.
Finally, the Pure requirement that the controlling shareholders do not
pose any retributive threat to minority shareholders in order to coerce
acceptance of the front-end offer is a sensible one, and this could easily
be extended to the European framework. Even if such a requirement is
more difficult to apply and rarely invoked in jurisdictions where corpo-
rate litigation is infrequent, the absence of a rule against retributive
threats "closes the system." Thus, a prohibition against retributive ac-
tion should be explicitly and uniformly provided across the European
Union.
CONCLUSION
Profound and meaningful differences exist between different legal
systems concerning freeze-out rights. Striking similarities exist, too. No
system is free from flaws, just as no system is inherently superior to the
other. The last two sections have advocated that the United States and
Europe each learn from the other to improve their own approaches to
freeze-out transactions.
The specific reforms proposed are more profound and complicated in
Europe, while they are more simple in the United States. In neither case,
however, do these reforms call for an overhaul of the existing legal
framework. Rather, the reforms suggested in this Article can largely be
characterized as part of a natural evolution along an already-existing tra-
jectory. By learning from each other, the two systems might also move
toward greater transcontinental harmonization.
Legal harmonization does not have positive value in itself. Legal
transplants are often the cause of dangerous rejections, and similar rules
applied in different legal, economic, and social environments can gener-
207. See Kaisanlahti, supra note 5, at 507.
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ate monsters or betray their own original purposes. 20 8 The recent finan-
cial crisis, with its origins in the United States, might suggest looking
beyond the U.S. system of corporate law and financial governance as a
model for reform. At the beginning of a new decade, a call for conver-
gence blows against the protectionist winds whistling through Europe
and the United States. If superficial slogans are to be abandoned for
more serious discussion, however, it is undeniable that each system
claims some of the most advanced freeze-out regulations in the world,
and valuable lessons and ideas can be derived from studying the sys-
tems in parallel. The transatlantic corporate governance dialogue should
facilitate mutual understanding of comparative differences and advance
reform proposals inspired by this deeper comprehension. In light of the
substantial interdependence of financial markets demonstrated by the
financial crisis, greater convergence toward rules that strike a balance
between efficiency and investor protection is more desirable than ever.
Freeze-out rules are a small, but important, piece of this dialogue.
208. As I have argued, this is the case with respect to the mandatory bid in the Takeover Di-
rective, transplanted from the United Kingdom to continental Europe, in systems with a more
concentrated ownership structure. See Ventoruzzo, supra note 144.
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